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Introduction
Western civilization is in transition.
After centuries of modernity, western culture is beginning to see the world around
it in an entirely different worldview. For the past two to three hundred years, reason and
empiricism ruled: if a claim couldn't be proven scientifically, or if a proposition was
shown to be umeasonable, then that claim or proposition was discarded as untrue. Truth
was defined as that which could be proven through reason or science.
Of course, this posed a sticky problem for the church. After all, how could one
scientifically prove the supernatural? How could one make a reasonable argument for a
miracle, such as the resurrection of Christ? David Hume, a pioneer ofthe Enlightenment,
asserted the modernist proposition that even if the resurrection did happen, it proves not
that Christ was divine but only that he somehow managed to cheat death. Interestingly,
however, the church made a tactical error in answering this assault of reason and science
upon it: it chose to fight fire with fire, and created its own pseudo-science to demonstrate
the truth of the Bible. Faith turned into apologetics-indubitable propositions "proving"
the Scriptures.
This attempt to fight modernism by embracing it led to three results: 1) faith
became dependent on reason; 2) the paradoxes and mystery of God and the scriptures
were harmonized in one-dimensional, often anti-intellectual interpretations; and 3) the
church found itself still shackled to modernity when the world view unexpectedly shifted
to postmodernism.
First, in trying to reasonably prove Christianity, the church made faith a result of
reason instead of the other way around. Faith depended upon that which could be seen or
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proven, or else it wasn't valid. This offered a very shallow faith-one that the world has
not found appealing, to judge by the steady decline of the church in the twentieth century 1
despite the barrage of apologetic resources and speakers flooding the continents. These
apologetics might have convinced the church; unfortunately, it isn't the church that needs
convincing, but the world. And the world's response has been ho-hum at best.
This led to the second effect of modernism on the church. In order to reasonably
prove Christianity, the church needed a reliable authority that was consistent with the
laws of reason. The Bible, which Christians considered the word of God, was that
authority; however, what was to be done with its obvious paradoxes and anomalies,
which ran contrary to reason? Modern Christians found they had to work to harmonize
these inconsistencies lest their reliable authority be deemed unreasonable-but in doing
so, they shoehorned an infinitely mysterious God into their little theological boxes.
Again, the world was not convinced. In fact, the tactic backfired when literary and textual
critics pointed out vehemently that the modern Christians' attempts to harmonize
scripture were anti-intellectual at best, and dishonest at worst.
Finally, there is the issue of the church awkwardly caught in the death grip of
modernity as contemporary philosophers began to deconstruct scientism and chip away at
propositions that have been embraced as truth for several generations. Theologian Karl
Barth once said that "when the church weds itself to the spirit of the age, it will find itself
a widow in the next." 2 As history enters the third millennium A.D., that is precisely the
predicament in which the western church finds itself
1

For extensive documentation on the decline in 20 1h-century church attendance and membership,
see Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, The Churching ofAmerica, 1776-1990 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1997).
2
Comment made by Barth in casual conversation and repeated by Larry Shelton, Th.D., Professor
of Wesleyan Theology at George Fox University, Portland, Oregon, 1999.
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In the 18th and 19th centuries, the church embraced modernism gradually, but in
the end so completely that the modernist worldview and the church itself became
inseparable. At the end of the 201h century, the church is preparing to repeat its mistake:
in an attempt to be relevant to the postmodern culture, it is embracing postmodernism just
as it formerly embraced modernism. This is a serious danger because, as Barth warned, a
church married to the current paradigm will be left with nothing when the paradigm
changes. Paradigms come and go; what happens when the postmodern paradigm dies the
same death as modernity?
And there is no doubt that it will. Postmodernism is a transitional paradigm-a
corrective reaction to modernism. Modernism is, in a sense, postmodernism's life-force:
once modernism breathes its last, postmodernism-which exists only to deconstruct
modernism, rebel against its empiricism and rationalism, and shatter its idol of
scientism-will follow.
Soon, therefore, the church will once again find itself in the awkward position of
trying to distance itself from a paradigm it unwisely rushed to adopt in the name of
"reaching the culture." So what is the church to do? How can Christians avoid riding the
pendulum back and forth with each new paradigm shift-or is it even possible?

C. S. Lewis: a Model for Consideration
A compelling answer might be found in the life of C. S. Lewis-probably
Christianity's most popular spokesperson of the twentieth century. Decades after his
death, Lewis' books maintain phenomenal appeal, still selling more than 1.5 million
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copies each year in the 1990s. 3 The atheist-turned-theist-turned-Christian is considered a
theologian to the masses-a layman's apologist. Even his books for children are filled
with theological truths, yet utterly readable and engaging. Citing examples such as

Aesop's Fables and Pilgrim's Progress, one scholar points out that while most classic
literature migrates from adult libraries to the nursery, Lewis' astounding achievement is
that his books written for the nursery-especially the Narnia Chronicles-are so moving
and profound that they have "ended in the library--even the libraries oftheologians." 4
Why? What is the appeal of C. S. Lewis? Why have millions of people of all ages
found him so irresistible for so many years? One explanation is that he appeals to the
modern mind with his use of rational argument. In Mere Christianity, his foundational
claims, representational theory of language, and clear use of reason build upon the work
of Immanuel Kant and other writers of the Enlightenment.
While highly acclaimed in modernist circles, however, Lewis' appeal reaches into
postmodernist circles as well. His creation of different worlds and realities, his emphasis
on divine mystery, his use of narrative to present his theology, his spirituality, and his
mystical experiences (such as his lifelong search for the experience he called Joy, which
he always capitalized), and even his seemingly self-contradictory claims of antifoundationalism are clearly aspects of postmodernism.
This is a paradox: postmodernism is by definition the opposite of modernism, the
former having come into being for the sole purpose of reacting against and
deconstructing the latter. How, therefore, can Lewis communicate so effectively to the
modernist and the postmodernist alike, since they are opposed to each other? Can a
3

George Sayer, Jack: A Life of C. S. Lewis (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1994), 413.
John Wilson, "An Appraisal of C. S. Lewis and his Influence on Modem Evangelicalism,"
Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 9 (Spring 1991 ): 33.
4
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person be a modernist and a postmodernist at the same time, or is there another paradigm
that transcends both?
To answer this, one must look beyond the two paradigms-which, for the
contemporary philosopher, is nearly impossible. All persons now living have experienced
only these two paradigms-roughly, modernism in the first half of this century and
postmodernism in the second. For them, trying to comprehend anything else is like a
tribal New Guinean trying to comprehend Philadelphia without ever having seen it: even
if a member of the tribe traveled there and returned to relate what she had experienced,
the others, having lived all their lives knowing only their own culture and their own
ways, would have difficulty understanding.
Nonetheless, while attempting to answer the question concerning Lewis' appeal to
both modernists and postmodernists, it can be argued that there is indeed a third paradigm
with which the current populace is unfamiliar. In other words, the reason for Lewis'
enduring popularity and relevance is that he is neither a modernist nor a postmodemist,
but instead represents a third, unnamed paradigm which uses the strengths of both.

Viewing Lewis Through a Single Lens
To understand the paradox of C. S. Lewis as a paradigmatic figure-neither a
modernist nor a postmodernist-it is instructive to read scholarly attempts to place Lewis
neatly in one camp or the other. One such attempt is made by philosopher John
Beversluis.
Beversluis, approaching the world as a modernist, makes the mistake of
interpreting Lewis through an exclusively modernist worldview and trying to force him
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into a single paradigm. He therefore dismisses as a contradiction any variation from
modernism, and especially from modernistic rationalism in Lewis' writings, when the
fault lies not with the writings but with Beversluis' own single-focus lens.
Beversluis reveals his unbending modernist mindset even in the way he
approaches his subject. He divides Lewis' entire case for believing in God into three neat
categories: the Argument from Desire, the Argument from Moral Law, and the Argument
from Reason. 5 Then he dispatches each one in turn by comparing it only to the modernist
ideal of rationalism, evidently unable to imagine any other standard of comparison.
First, the Argument from Desire focuses on Lewis' lifelong quest for Joy. Based
on the famous conversion story in which Lewis calls himself "the most reluctant convert
in all of England," 6 Beversluis tries to catch Lewis in a contradiction by asking: Why
would a person be so reluctant to meet the Object of the Joy he had desired all his life?7
In addition to an apparent inability to comprehend the conflict of a sinner meeting
a holy God (in fact, the scriptures are filled with persons who desired God but recoiled
from him in utter awe or terror), 8 the question reveals the error of believing, and
believing that Lewis believed, that the way to faith is through reason. Beversluis
dismisses Lewis' simultaneous attraction and aversion to God as unreasonable, and
therefore untenable. However, a careful reading of Lewis' writings will show that
although many of his works-especially Mere Christianity, Miracles, The Problem of

Pain and The Abolition of Man-defended Christianity with reason and logic, Lewis

5

John Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (Grand Rapids, MI: William
B. Eerdmans, 1985), 7.
6
C. S. Lewis, Surprised by Joy (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace, 1955), 228.
7
Beversluis, 20
8
See Genesis 3:8, Isaiah 6:5, Ezekiel1:28, Daniel10:7-8, Jonah 1:3, Acts 9:4, Revelation 1:17,
and many others.
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never referred to reason when describing Joy. 9 To him, it was obviously beyond reason,
above reason. Beversluis' insistence that the experience of faith be forced exclusively
into the grid of modem rationalism is a great blunder, certainly not supported by the
works of Lewis as a whole.
Next, Beversluis attacks Lewis' Argument from Moral Law. Lewis pointed out
that people everywhere have an innate sense of lawfulness and unlawfulness, as shown
by universal cries such as "That's not right!" and "That's not fair!" Since this internal law
clearly exists, he argues, there must be an author of the law; he calls it "Something
Behind" the law. 10 Beversluis declaims this as "a very poor argument, one that can be
disposed ofwith unusual speed" 11 -which he attempts to do as follows:

Summary of Lewis' argument

Example ofsimilar argument

1) If there is Something behind the facts
observed by science, it cannot manifest
itself externally ... .it must remain
entirely unknown or it must make itself
known in some other way.
2) [There is] an internal command urging
us to behave morally [which] cannot be
observed by science ....
3) Therefore there is Something [a Power]
behind the Moral Law.

1) If you are to pass this test, you will have
to study very hard.

2) You did study very hard.

3) Therefore you will pass this test.

12

He uses the obvious fallacy of the second argument to claim that Lewis' argument
is parallel and therefore equally fallacious, according to logic and reason. However, he
employs only one of modernism's two main definitions of reason: "pure reason," which
9

Instead, he used the language of poetry, myth, and mystery; see the whole of Surprised by Joy,
especially 16-18, 72-73, and 219-222.
10
See Lewis, Mere Christianity, "What Lies Behind the Law," 31-35. The concept of"Something
Behind" creation, science, and Moral Law permeates the chapter; the actual words appear on p. 32, in a
section on science.
11
Beversluis, 51.
12
Ibid., 50-51.
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is limited to the experience of space and time and discounts anything else as an
"illusion." 13 However, Kant presents an alternate view called "practical reason," which is
"not of a logical but of a moral nature. " 14 It is practical reason Lewis uses when he
defends Christianity by arguing for the existence of a Moral Law.
To add to this, Stephan Korner writes, "The Critique of Pure Reason, which is
concerned with our judgements [sic] of fact, is expressly aware that we also judge that
certain things which are not fact, ought to be fact." 15
In comparing pure reason and practical reason, Grenz and Olson assert that Kant
"was convinced that certain rational principles control all valid moral judgments, just as
other rational principles lie at the foundation of all theoretical or sense-based
knowledge." 16 Hendrikus Berkhof presents a summary of Kant's view of practical reason
as related but superior to pure reason: "For him intellect, pure reason, and practical
reason are the three floors of a building. The windows of these floors offer different
views of the outside world. On the first, one sees the world of the senses; on the second,
the faraway blue skies. The third opens to a wide landscape. From here one also sees the
overall connection with the views ofthe lower floors." 17
Beversluis cannot "make the jump" with Lewis from pure reason to practical
reason, and thus finds Lewis' Argument from Morality inconclusive.
Lewis, in fact, sees a clear progression of reason from Moral Law, after the
fashion of Kant and his categorical imperative. This will be explored later, but for now,

13

Hendrikus Berkhof, Two Hundred Years of Theology: Report of a Personal Journey, trans. John
Vriend (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1989), 2.
14
Ibid., 4.
15
Stephan Komer, Kant (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 129.
16
Stanley J. Grenz & Roger E. Olson, 20'11-Century Theology: God and the World in a
Transitional Age (Downer's Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 1992), 27.
17
Berkhof, 6.
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the point is to show how a critic viewing Lewis through a single worldview may
misinterpret Lewis, leading to an inaccurate critique.
Finally, Beversluis addresses the Argument from Reason. According to
Beversluis, Lewis believed that all knowledge hinges on valid reasoning 18 (which Lewis
did not, as has been shown) and that reason "commits us to believing in a superior
Mind." 19 He charges, however, that Lewis violates basic principles oflogic, fails to prove
his argument, and grossly oversimplifies complex theological issues:
Within the compass of less than fifty pages he attempts to prove the
objectivity of morality, to refute ethical relativism and ethical
subjectivism, to establish the existence of a Power behind the Moral Law,
to show that atheism is too simple and theological liberalism too na"ive, to
prove that Jesus is God and that orthodox Christianity is the only view that
faces all the facts, and to offer some practical advice about how too deal
with conflicting theories of atonement-all this before wrapping things up
with a resounding appeal to accept God's offer of salvation while there is
still time. 20
At the end of his critique, Beversluis has packaged Lewis into a tidy bundle:
Lewis' apologetics, he feels, are effectively shown to be irrational, irresponsible and
ignorant, communicated with an arrogant contempt for philosophical and epistemological
principles. But Beversluis' argument is an incomplete study based on an erroneous
premise. Lewis does not fit completely into a modernist world view. In fact, the failure of
Beversluis and others to "get" Lewis simply proves that he has more range and depth
than they.
First, Lewis' apparent simplicity is perhaps not so simple. For example, just as
Beversluis charges that Lewis' autobiography, Surprised by Joy, consists more of

18

Beversluis, 75.
Ibid., 58.
20
Beversluis, 33
19
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apologetics than autobiography, 21 one could reply that Mere Christianity is as much
autobiography as apologetics. Beversluis sees the latter book solely as the progression of
an argument. How might he critique it differently if he saw it as the progression of a
life-the story of Lewis' own progression from atheism to theism to Christianity? If Mere
Christianity recounts Lewis' own intellectual journey, then its simplicity is irrelevant; it
worked for Lewis and is therefore valid.
Further, concerning Beversluis' charge that Lewis' apologetics are simplistic, it
should be noted that simplicity does not invalidate an argument. The example of Jesus
comes to mind.
Finally, Beversluis' strongest point is made in the Argument from Reason. He
revels in British philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe's challenge to Lewis' reasoning in
1948, which might have prompted Lewis rework his book Miracles for later editions.

22

Lewis himself never claimed to be an expert logician; he argued ideas, not fine points as
philosophers such as Anscombe (and Beversluis) like to do.
It could be mentioned, however, that although Lewis reworked his arguments for

a later edition of Miracles, he never renounced his central claims. Perhaps Lewis'
Argument from Reason does not stand up under a microscope of pure reason, but Lewis
did not seem to think that that microscope was the only lens through which truth could be
viewed.
In fact, it is amazing to see Beversluis try to compare Lewis' two great treatises
on suffering while retaining this same single-lens perspective. Beversluis compares The
Problem ofPain, written in 1940, which he declares an intelligible position, to A Grief

21
22

Beversluis, 9-10.
Beversluis, 65-69.
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Observed-in which, he says, Lewis' "confidence was nonexistent, his worries allconsuming, and his argument incoherent" 23-with complete disregard for the personal
experiences Lewis had suffered between the two.
To Beversluis, in other words, A Grief Observed is not the journal of a widower
in agony, pouring out his rage and confusion toward God, but the treatise of an individual
with a "strategy,"24 trying to keep his apologetic dike plugged in the midst of seeming
injustice. Beversluis' mistake would be humorous, if it weren't so sad. He is unable to
distinguish between an apology and a journal. Of modernism's shortcomings, this is
perhaps its greatest: logic, reason and apologetics do not comprehend anguish. This has
led other scholars to reject Beversluis' critique of Lewis because he "misrepresents Lewis
in ways that are simply inexcusable" and "ignores every development in recent
philosophy that would support Lewis on specific points."25 (It is also interesting to note
that Beversluis does not even attempt to tackle any of Lewis' fiction or the apologetics
found in it. Could this be because of modernism's limited understanding of reality, or
perhaps because modernism cannot perceive truth in any form other than cold, hard
reason?)
Beversluis' greatest misstep is in trying to box a person in, as any good modernist
would do, and then tear down that box from within his own worldview. He tries to
understand Lewis through his own rationalistic worldview and thus reaches faulty
conclusions.

23
24

25

(1987): 37.

Beversluis, 162.
Bevers luis, 163.
Thomas Talbott, "C. S. Lewis and the Problem of Evil," Christian Scholar's Review 17, no. I
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An Overview of Studies of C. S. Lewis
Although C. S. Lewis is known for his rational defense of Christianity in works
such as Mere Christianity, The Abolition of Man and The Problem of Pain, it is perhaps
somewhat ironic that showing his modernist side is more difficult than one might expect.
While he sets out, like a true modernist, to place Christianity on a solid foundation of
reason in Mere Christianity, he also establishes clear limits to-and criticisms ofscientism, which has been called the religion of twentieth-century modernism? 6
Ever since men were able to think, they have been wondering what this
universe really is and how it came to be there. And, very roughly, two
views have been held. First, there is what is called the materialist view.
People who take that view think that matter and space just happen to exist,
and always have existed, nobody knows why; ... The other view is the
religious view ... [and you] cannot find out which view is the right one by
science in the ordinary sense .... Do not think I am saying anything against
science: I am only saying what its job is .... and a very useful and necessary
job it is too. But why anything comes to be there at all, and whether there
is anything behind the things science observes .. .is not a scientific
question. 27
As a renowned literary critic, Lewis also saw both the value and the limits of
textual criticism in establishing the trustworthiness of the Bible. 28 Rational science is not
thebe-all and end-all of discovering truth. In fact, Lewis' most effective way of
communicating theological issues is not through rational analysis, as in Mere

Christianity, but through narrative and allegory, as in The Space Trilogy, The Screwtape
Letters, The Chronicles of Narnia, and The Great Divorce. Clearly, it is difficult to pour

26

See Lawrence Cahoone, ed., From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology (Cambridge,
MA: Blackwell, 1996), 12; Nancey Murphy & James Wm. McClendon, "Distinguishing Modem and
Postmodern Theologies," Modern Theology, 5, no. 3 (April1989): 192.
27
C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York, NY: Macmillan Press, 1952), 31-32.
28
Richard B. Cunningham, C. S. Lewis: Defender of the Faith (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster,
1967), 91.

Page 14
Lewis into a mold of pure modernism, as evidenced by the problems of those like
Beversluis who have tried to do so.
Much that has been written about Lewis centers on what may be called his
defensive apologetic versus his imaginative apologetic. The first method entails a simple,
colloquial use of foundationalism and reason to offer logical proof of God's existence.
The second enlists story and allegory to communicate theological truths. The question
then arises: if Lewis felt equally at home communicating in both realms-modern
foundationalism and postmodern narrative-why and how did he select which medium to
use when? Why did he so vigorously employ them both at various times, and with great
versatility? The answer lies in Lewis' primary motivation of evangelism.

Lewis the Evangelist
"The proper study of shepherds is sheep, not (save accidentally) other shepherds.
And woe to you if you do not evangelize," Lewis said once, in a paper he was reading at
Cambridge. 29 It is interesting that despite explicit statements like this and many other
expressions, there has been debate over the motivation behind the writings of C. S.
Lewis. The discussion has become dichotomized, categorizing Lewis either as a defender
of and apologist for Christianity, or as an evangelist.
John Wilson argues that Lewis was "an apologist, not an evangelist" because,
although he clearly believed in salvation only through the cross of Christ, he "refused to
go further." 30 This is expressed not as a criticism, but as proof that Lewis should be
considered a "defender of faith" rather than an evangelist. However, it is not clear what
Wilson meant by going "further" or what, according to Wilson, one must do to gain
29
30

C. S. Lewis, Christian Reflections (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1967), 152.
Wilson, "An Appraisal of C. S. Lewis," 27; see also 35.
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entrance into the "evangelist" locker room. Wilson would do better to say that Lewis'
style was apologetic rather than evangelistic. It is entirely possible for a person to be both
an apologist and an evangelist, and Lewis' life indicates that he was.
In fact, there is strong evidence that evangelism was the driving force behind his
apologetic works. Evangelism was very important to Lewis. It was not tent-meeting
evangelism or door-to-door evangelism, but this does not disqualify him as an evangelist.
Lewis communicated to ordinary folk. Even Wilson acknowledges admiringly:
"Lewis wrote, in simple language, on profound subjects .... He was a brilliant debater but,
at heart, he was always appealing to commonsense." 31 To illustrate Lewis' great skill in
this area, Wilson uses the delightful example of Lewis' statement that, to understand
Almighty God's limiting of himself to human form, one should try to imagine oneself

. a sIug. 32
becommg
Indeed, Lewis' communications did reach far beyond the walls of the church and
were intended to do so. He became world famous when his series of articles, published as
the instant bestseller The Screwtape Letters in 1941, appeared in the now defunct
Guardian newspaper. For the next three years he had a series of talks on BBC radio, later
compiled as Broadcast Talks (in the U.S., The Case for Christianity), Christian Behavior,
and Beyond Personality, and finally published as Mere Christianity in 1952. He spoke at
R.A.F. bases and filled Oxford's University Church when he lectured there, something
only one other person-the Archbishop--could do. 33
In all these pursuits, Lewis was not "preaching to the choir," as the saying goes,
but to those unfamiliar with Christian jargon and scripture. Ifthe newspaper articles,
31

32
33

Ibid., 35.
Ibid.; the original quote is in Lewis, Mere Christianity, 155.
Cunningham, 31-32.
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radio broadcasts and public lectures were meant for the masses, then why would the
subsequent books not be? In fact, both books-as well as most of his other works-are
evangelistic in nature, intended for unbelievers. Lewis' speeches were primarily in
defense of Christianity, and in this sense Wilson is correct; however, since they were
directed to general audiences, evangelism-the desire to share the gospel with the
masses-was the intent.
"You may have felt you were ready to listen to me as long as you thought I had
anything new to say; but if it turns out to be only religion, well, the world has tried that
and you cannot put the clock back. If anyone is feeling that way I should like to say three
things to him,"34 says Lewis, obviously speaking to unbelievers. He then goes on to
defend the gospel by saying the "three things" and a good many more, anticipating their
objections and using language that would be familiar to them. Through simplicity in
argument, use of common language, and establishment of a target reader, it is
demonstrated that the motivation behind the writings mentioned here (and many others
too numerous to discuss) is evangelistic in nature.

Lewis the Rational Apologist
Most contemporary scholars, and even Lewis himself, have agreed that Lewis was
a rationalist. Lewis placed a high value on reason and used it effectively in his arguments,
appealing to unbelievers who trusted in their own thinking rather than in scripture. His
plan of attack was to find an indubitable foundation upon which believers and

34

Lewis, Mere Christianity, 36.
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unbelievers cannot disagree, and progress from there. Lewis not only suggested that
Christianity could be scrutinized by the tests of reason; he insisted that it should be. 35
Richard B. Cunningham says Lewis had great confidence that reason would come
down on the side of Christianity-that "reason faithfully pursued is a path that leads to
God." 36 Cunningham says reason "helps clarify one's immortal longings and, when
rigorously followed, can lead to a theistic position, and then to revelation and the door of
faith." 37 As much as Lewis respected reason, however, he seems to have disagreed with
Cunningham that it was the primary or only way to faith, stating instead that all our
knowledge depends on a mix of authority, reason, and experience? 8
Richard Purtill emphasizes Lewis' view that faith and reason are not opposed to
each other. Unlike many Christians who see the two as enemies, Lewis embraced the title
of Christian rationalist. He believed, according to Purtill, that "faith should be based on
the evidence, not fly in the face of the evidence. " 39 He points out, as others do, that Lewis
delineated two types of faith: Faith-A, an intellectual faith, and Faith-B, a religious faith.
These have been described in various ways-Beversluis called the first "philosophical,"
40

and Purtill called the second "faith as a commitment to God" 41 -but most researchers

on the subject do distinguish between them in some way. Purtill says that "our age is
different from many previous ages in that many people are half-educated: not wise
enough to assess the arguments for God, not simple enough to trust 'all those wise men'
who have. Therefore, in our days a number of Christians are confused about their grounds
35

Cunningham, 77.
Ibid., 79.
37
Ibid.
38
Lewis, Christian Reflections, 41.
39
Richard L. Purtill, C. S. Lewis's Case for the Christian Faith (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1981),
72.
40
Beversluis, 7.
36

41
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for belief. When their faith is challenged, they either abandon their commitment or retreat
to a sort of stubborn insistence: 'Don't confuse me with the arguments; I know it's
true. "' 42
Purtill suggests that this is perhaps why Lewis is so popular: he appeals to an
"appetite" for argument that exists in the ordinary Christian. While it is sometimes
claimed that faith is just a "leap in the dark,"43 most Christians desire to know that what
they believe is true. Lewis' ability to argue such complex and abstract ideas in language
used by the laity appeals to and satisfies that appetite.
However, not all scholars share the view that Lewis esteemed rational apologetics
above all else. Robert Holyer presents a deeper Lewis, one who used reason when he saw
fit but did not rely on it to "make or break" the Christian faith.
Holyer agrees that Lewis' rational arguments were '"absolutely compelling' to
any rational mind," but immediately adds that Lewis always said belief in God "could
never be based on arguments that compelling-indeed, that demonstration of this sort
would prove inimical to faith." 44 In other words, apologetics that pass the test of reason
could still be hostile to belief in God, because belief based solely on reason no longer
requires faith.
Holyer also makes the important point that besides reason, Lewis also appeals
directly to human experience and to the imagination. In many cases, his goal was not to
show that Christianity is irrefutably true by rational proofs, but simply to show that
"religious beliefs are neither produced, nor ultimately assured, by argument alone but
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by ... feelings and desires as well." 45 Holyer, unlike Beversluis, perceives that Lewis is
able to use more than one paradigm to communicate the gospel, and thus he comes to a
much deeper and more accurate understanding of Lewis.
As western society moves fully into a postmodern paradigm, contemporary
scholars might be tempted to leave behind Lewis' emphasis on reason and focus instead
on his use of postmodern elements such as narrative, spirituality and mysticism.
However, while it is a mistake to see Lewis as a total modernist, painting him as purely
postmodern would be just as wrong. Indeed, Lewis placed a tremendous significance on
reason, using it variously to prove the Christian faith, or merely to remove obstacles to
faith. But reason does not complete his case for Christianity.

Lewis the Imaginative Apologist
Scholars have struggled with trying to define Lewis' other methods. Wilson
defines these as "imaginative apologetics" and cites the Space Trilogy as just one
example of how much theology Lewis packs into his stories. Wilson argues that, though
they can be read as fairy tales, "they are full of images and symbols which are easily
interpreted. This can give aesthetic delight-we can see the hidden meaning." 46 Finally,
Wilson argues that reason and imagination are not dichotomous but complementary: "It
seems to me that both reason and imagination are necessary for apologetics; Lewis had
both. I suspect the sad truth is that, for many Christians, one of these faculties is
missing." 47
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If Cunningham saw reason as total to Lewis' method, Ralph C. Wood places
Lewis on the opposite end of the spectrum and argues that Lewis' strength is clearly his
imagination. First, however, Wood's comments against Lewis' apologetic writings, while
not relevant to his case for Lewis' imaginative writings, should be mentioned for the sake
of thorough discussion.
In a lengthy section, Wood decries Lewis' rational apologetics as his weakest

work-Mere Christianity "mangles" the gospel and The Problem ofPain is "wrong"and dismisses Lewis' interest in reason as merely a holdover from the part it played in
Lewis' own conversion, saying, "We are seldom argued into the Kingdom. "48 This last
point is not in debate-Lewis himself doubted that reason alone could convert anyoneand the former points are disputed by the many who, believers or not, have found Lewis'
apologetics either intellectually brilliant or spiritually life-changing. However, Wood
says all this merely to make his point, which is that Lewis' imaginative work is "his best
and most readable confession of the gospel. " 49
Wood's praise for Lewis' use of narrative is poignant. He claims that Lewis
sought to do for others what the writings of George Macdonald had done for Lewis
himself: baptize the imagination 50 by explaining difficult ideas, such as Sehnsucht and the
nature of holiness, through the reader's own imagination.
"Essentially imagination was for Lewis just what the common use of the term
would suggest: an exceptionally inventive way of seeing things ... .it was, first and
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foremost, images." 51 says Robert Houston Smith. The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe,
for example, began not with an idea for a theme or a plot, but with an image in Lewis'
mind of a faun walking through the snow, holding an umbrella. From this, the rest of the
story began to unfold. 52
According to Smith, Lewis believed imagination was not only a good way, but the
best and sometimes only way to communicate higher truths; he strongly disagreed that
anything imaginative is automatically false. 53 In a detailed explanation, Smith traces the
branches of Lewis' imaginative apologetics: 1) allegory, which Lewis later abandoned as
too artificial; 2) analogy, which he found much more to his liking and used extensively in
all his works; 3) myth, which Smith contends was Lewis' favorite form of
communication; and 4) children's fiction, although Smith makes the point that, for
example, the Namia tales are really adult fiction written for children and the Space
Trilogy is really a child's fairy tale for grownups. 54
Another way to view Lewis' imaginative apologetic is to see Christianity the way
he saw it: as myth. Stratford Caldecott notes that Lewis the atheist and Lewis the
Christian both saw Christianity as a myth, but for very different reasons. Lewis the atheist
saw Christianity as a fairy tale presented with the appearance of truth. However, Lewis
the Christian acknowledged that Christianity is indeed myth, defined as a story of
supernatural deity interacting with humanity, and also identified the other defining
elements: 1) a hero, whose birth is marked with supernatural favor; 2) an oppressive
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enemy; and 3) a task in which only the hero can fulfill-recovering a treasure closely
guarded by the enemy 55 (in this case, of course, the souls of his people). Caldecott
describes the Christian myth as "the Drama within all drama, the Story that all good
stories reflect. The overcoming of death by infinite Love is the Quest at the heart of every
quest, and the sacrifice that makes it possible is the essence of all heroism. In the
Gospels, literal truth and universal symbolism, history and legend, time and eternity
coincide." 56
Christians are often uneasy with this idea, primarily because they associate
"myth" more with the concept of "make-believe" than with the concept of mystery and
profound truth. A popular definition of myth is something that is not true-a fiction, a
fable, a fairy tale. Thus, to define Christianity as myth is to belittle the faith. But this is a
limited view of myth. It is through myth that a Christian may come to understand
spiritual truth. Through myth, things which take enormous courage to believe but which
cannot be proved or disproved, such as the resurrection of Jesus Christ, can suddenly be
understood as reasonable. Perhaps it could be said, as Lewis might have said, that faith
must ultimately walk through the door of the imagination. Caldecott concludes his
treatment of Lewis' use of faith and imagination by saying that " ... as Lewis found in his
own life, Christian myth becomes Christian experience and in due course, in God's good
time, the proofs from experience that we lacked in the beginning are ours as well. For we
do not walk in the dark forever. " 57
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Corbin Scott Carnell takes the "baptized imagination" concept to another level,
focusing not on the stories Lewis wrote but on the story he lived. Through the Inklings, a
group of intellectuals who met for hours each week in a local pub, batting around theories
of theology and language, Lewis' mystical understanding of Christianity matured. He
was shaped the most through his intellectual sparring with Owen Barfield about
imagination, reason and language, and especially through his deep friendship with
Charles Williams:
Atheism had appealed to Lewis as a dogmatic system, something one
could prove by hardhitting dialectic. His earliest efforts in theology after
he became a practicing Anglican show that he would have liked to make
Christianity as neat and foolproof as atheism had once seemed .... As
Lewis came under the influence of Williams' eclectic thought with its
strongly mystical bent, certain important changes resulted .... [Through]
this friend who lived his loyalties contagiously yet without seeking to
defend them with compulsive logic, Lewis' ideas were reshaped [to allow]
paradoxes, ironies, and tensions .... " 58
This was a crucial step in Lewis' dawning awareness that reason could not
account for everything, and that imaginative story or myth often revealed different or
deeper truths than logic. Carnell even suggests that Williams' influence in these areas
was directly responsible for most of Lewis' best work. 59
By all accounts, however, the most significant influence upon Lewis' developing
imagination was the work of George Macdonald. Lewis read him avidly and admired
both his deep spiritual devotion and his "ability to make the crimson and gold of
mythopoeic never-never lands the vehicle of Christian truth." 60 Macdonald moved Lewis
toward more metaphysical and symbolic uses of language to express the highest truths
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until he learned to find meaning in both reason and imagination. Carnell argues that "it is
this dual approach which makes him unusual in an age when it has been fashionable
either to damn reason and live for art or to reject artistic statement as empirically
meaningless. " 61
This is the key to understanding Lewis' appeal to both modernists and
postmodernists. Lewis virtually married intellect to imagination; his uniqueness is his
ability to operate easily in both realms-the rational world of the modernist, and the
imaginative world ofthe postmodernist.

The Modern Lewis
Along the timeline of western history, modernism is a mere glitch, appearing for
only about three hundred years before dissolving away again in the second half of the 20th
century. Its starting point is debatable: some say it was the 16th-century Reformation,
when authority shifted from the church to the individual, and thought shifted from belief
to the skepticism of Erasmus and Montaigne; some pinpoint the 1ih -century scientific
revolution of Galileo, Newton, Descartes and others; other argue for the 18th -century
French and American Revolutions, or even the 19th-century industrial revolution ofthe
1800s. 62 One theory determines its starting point not by the calendar but by Descartes'
assertion ("I think, therefore I am"), which gave the individual a central position in the
universe and viewed him as an autonomous, rational being. 63 In view of all these factors,
a practical starting point is the beginning of the 18th_century Enlightenment.
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Lawrence Cahoone defines modernism as the notable rise of numerous factors,
including rationalism, individualism, humanism, capitalism, secularization,
democratization, and significant advances in science and industry. 64 In summary, it can
be seen as the birth of a civilization "founded on scientific knowledge of the world and
rational knowledge of value, which places the highest premium on individual human life
and freedom, and believes that such freedom and rationality will lead to social progress
through virtuous, self-controlled work, creating a better material, political, and
intellectual life for all"-or, on the negative side, a movement of "ethnic and class
domination, European imperialism, anthropocentrism, the destruction of nature, the
dissolution of community and tradition, the rise of alienation, the death of individuality in
bureaucracy. " 65
Modernism is a large area of study with many facets. To discover tendencies
toward modernism in some of Lewis' writings, it is useful to compare them to a
manageable model of modernism. Nancey Murphy and James McClendon have created a
helpful model which groups the characteristics of modernism into three axes:
epistemological foundationalism, the representational-expressivist theory of language,
and atomism or reductionism. 66

The Epistemological Axis
Epistemological foundationalism is "the view that knowledge can be justified
only by finding indubitable 'foundational' beliefs upon which it is constructed." 67 Every
claim must be justified by supporting claims that are also justified, either by reason or by
64
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empirical evidence, until one reaches a foundational proposition which cannot be
disputed and thus requires no further justification; if not, the argument becomes circular
and must be rejected. Since the modernist questions and discards any claims found to be
circular or without foundation, a natural effect of foundationalism is skepticism.
Therefore, Murphy and McClendon establish an epistemological axis with optimistic
foundationalism at one pole and pessimistic skepticism at the other. 68
Depending on one's perspective, Mere Christianity is either Lewis' most popular
and complete defense of Christianity or the most flawed. It is probably the book most
quoted by his supporters and the most criticized by his opponents. As has been
mentioned, the book describes a teleological apologetic and perhaps the same rational
journey Lewis himself went through on his road from atheism to theism to Christianity.
Although not every reader has been convinced, the argument in Mere Christianity-along
with his personal experience-did convince Lewis.
So what is Lewis' message? Since his intended audience was unbelievers, he did
not use the Bible to make his case. He started with good and evil, sin and sin's
consequences, believing his hearers could not fathom grace or forgiveness until they were
conscious of sin. 69 Therefore he developed his argument in three steps: 1) we are aware
of the existence of a Moral Law; 2) since there is a Moral Law, there must also be an
author, Something Behind that law; and 3) since evil exists, not on its own but only as a
rebellion against good, there must be a good for it to rebel against. He concluded that this
was the God described in Christianity. Stan Grenz and Roger Olson describe Kant's
position, which foreshadows that of Lewis: "Religion could be established, [Kant]
68
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argued, on the basis of practical reason-the ethical dimension of existence and the
corresponding moral faculty of the mind. For him, the moral sphere is the proper domain
of religion. There it reigns supreme, shielded from the findings of science." 70
Lewis makes the case for the existence of God on philosophical grounds, and
more specifically on moral grounds: he bases his entire argument on the existence of
Moral Law. He points out that people everywhere have standards for behavior, as
illustrated when one person objects that another has violated one of these standards; the
offender hardly ever rejects the standard, but instead attempts to justify the reason for
breaking it. 71 Stephan Korner states, "Indeed, to adopt the legal metaphor which Kant
uses in the Critique of Pure Reason, we are 'in possession' of specifically moral concepts
and specifically moral principles. Examples would be concepts such as 'duty' and
principles such as 'inflicting pain for the mere sake of doing so is always wrong.' About
the fact that we have such principles there is general agreement." 72 Like Lewis, Grenz
describes Kant's "categorical imperative" as a set of "universal principles of conduct" or
"a supreme principle of morality" 73 in which moral life consists of living by principles
that one wishes all to follow. 74 Incidentally, this again echoes the example of Jesus, who
simply said, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."
While scholars debate whether Moral Law actually exists and how we can be
certain of it, Lewis still succeeds in his plan of attack by, interestingly, appealing not
necessarily to reason but to the human heart. After all, how many people-both children
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and adults-have uttered the words: "That's not fair!" How many have found themselves
to be victims of gossip, betrayal, cheating, slander, inequality and injustice? Reading the
first few pages of Mere Christianity, the reader can already relate to occasions of Moral
Law in action. Purtill confirms: "No matter how skeptical we are about morality in
theory, as soon as a moral issue enters our lives we find ourselves making judgments
about rightness and wrongness. Whether it is a public issue such as the war in Vietnam,
Watergate, or the American hostages in Iran, or whether it is an injustice or injury of a
personal kind-a robbery, a rape, an act of cruelty done to or by someone we knowsooner or later something will cut through our theoretical moral skepticism or relativism
and make us say, 'That is wrong. "' 75
Further, whether or not he is accused of oversimplifying, Lewis does reach his
goal ofbuilding his case upon an indubitable and incorrigible foundation in the eyes of
his readers. Holyer states that Lewis' strongest philosophical argument for Christianity is
that he begins with premises which are "widely known to be true by both Christians and
non-Christians, theists and non-theists, and entail conclusions which are themselves
important Christian beliefs. Such arguments ... are claimed by some philosophers to be
precisely what Christians need if their beliefs are to be fully rational." 76
Once this foundation is laid, Lewis moves on to the next stage. He takes Kant's
categorical imperative one step further by pointing out that if there is a Natural or Moral
Law, reason dictates that it cannot have been written without a writer-a Power behind
the Moral Law. Note that he is describing a philosophical view, not a religious view, of
that Power; he has yet to introduce any concept of God. Cunningham suggests that "Both
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reason and morality point to the existence of God, but this says nothing about what kind
of God he is or how he is related to the world." 77 Beversluis also distinguishes between
philosophical views of God as, for example, the force that somehow caused the universe
to come into being, and religious views of God as the purposeful creator and redeemer,
seeking intimacy with and adoration from his creatures. 78
Paralleling this stage of Lewis' thought, the writings of Kant also address the
issue of the "Something Behind" the Moral Law. In developing his argument on practical
reason, Kant offers examples of ideas such as freedom, morality, and God as having
objects which cannot be perceived. Komer explains: "The postulates of practical reason
state that the Ideas of God, freedom and immortality have 'objects '-but no, of course,
objects which can be given to perception. They are not objects in the sense of The
Critique of Pure Reason, that is to say, manifolds of perception which have synthetic

unity or which are instances of the schematized Categories. They are non-phenomenal
'objects' whose existence is guaranteed only by the apprehension of the morallaw." 79
Berkhof adds, "The postulates of practical reason are final concepts, which do not
release further possibilities for new developments from within them. They stem from the
moral world and serve only that world." 80
Cunningham sees this stage of the argument as two-fold: "With his own peculiar
twist, Lewis uses the moral argument to establish not merely a Lawgiver but also man's
guilt before the Law." 81 Many perhaps would stop here, having established the existence
of a Higher Power. However, this is only stage two of Lewis' argument; it is not the end
77
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point. Lewis is arguing not for "mere theism" but "mere Christianity," following the
progressive nature of his own conversion to believing in Christ as God himself.
Finally, Lewis narrows the focus to seeing this Power that exists as the Christian
view of God: "My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and
unjust. But how had I got this idea ofjust and unjust? A man does not call a line crooked
unless he has some idea of a straight line. What was I comparing this universe with when
I called it unjust?" 82 Lewis saw that there is good and evil in the universe. However,
unlike dualism, which maintains that good and evil are equal powers, Lewis saw good as
that which stands in right relationship to the ultimate God, while evil is that which does
not. Good, he argues, can exist for good's sake, but evil cannot exist independently, for
evil's own sake; it can exist only as a rebellion against good. Therefore, evil is inferior to
good. Lewis sees this as support that God, against whom good is measured and identified,
must exist. 83 This again strikes a Kantian chord that the highest good cannot be realized
unless God exists. 84
The element that best ties Lewis to modernism is his connection to Kant's idea of
practical reason-the aspect of modernism with which he was most comfortable and
effective. Lewis' entire purpose for his argument is based upon foundationalism-"the
view that knowledge can be justified only by finding indubitable 'foundational' beliefs
upon which it is constructed." 85 Knowing that his audience would not tolerate "The Bible
says so" as proof of God's existence, he established a foundation for that existence by
pointing to the evidence for a Moral Law-a universal sense of right and wrong-which
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is something virtually all people can agree upon. Most people have been placed in a
situation where they had to appeal to the Moral Law to attempt to correct an injustice or
grievance. Beversluis' criticism implies that Lewis overshot the runway; however, it also
points out clearly what Lewis had intended to do all along: establish indubitable
foundations that all could agree upon as a basis for proving the existence of God.
On the first axis in the Murphy-McClendon model, where would Lewis be
placed? One reasonable position would be near Descartes-an optimistic foundationalist
because "for him [Descartes], God guaranteed that ideas represent a real world." 86
However, another author suggests that Lewis started at the other end, pessimistic
skepticism, and only after a harsh collision with reality did he slide toward optimistic
foundationalism: "He began by doubting just about everything, doubting even the things
we take for granted as everyday reality. Then World War I came along and threw him out
of the ivory tower. Forced to spend a couple of terms in the trenches in Ypres, Lewis
realized that some things in life are, in fact, quite real. Mud, for example-and the
German bullet that very nearly put him out of circulation for good." 87

The Linguistic Axis
The second Murphy-McClendon axis is linguistic in nature. Modernism asserts a
representational theory of language-one that sees words merely as representations of
objects. 88 "Gun" has no meaning beyond the object it represents: a mechanical device,
using a controlled explosion to discharge an object from its barrel at high speed.
However, modern philosophers ran into trouble with words that represented things other
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than objects (such as ethics, duty, love), so they added an expressivist or emotivist theory
of meaning in which language identifies the speaker's attitudes and emotions about an
object, not simply the object itself. 89 Although the two theories are more correlative than
polar, a person's view of the first will affect her view of the second. Therefore, this axis
places the representational theory at one pole and an expressivist or emotivist theory at
the other.
While defining his terms in Mere Christianity, Lewis gives a good example of the
difference between the two theories and hints at his preference. He points out that the
English word "gentleman" originally meant a male person who had some land and a coat
of arms. Over time, however, people decided that "gentleman" should be a complimentnot an objective identifier of a man who had land and a coat of arms, but an identifier of a
man who acted as they thought a man with land should act-that is, well-mannered. The
problem is that there were already words to identify such men: courteous, honorable,
brave. Now that the word "gentleman" intrudes upon the meaning of those words, there is
no word left to describe a man who has land and a coat of arms. He distinguishes between
the representational theory of language and the expressivist theory by saying, "When a
word ceases to be a term of a description and becomes merely a term of praise, it no
longer tells you facts about the object; it only tells you about the speaker's attitude to that
object. " 90
Similarly, Lewis points out that the word "Christian" was invented simply to
identify people in Antioch who accepted the teachings of Christ and his apostles: "There
is no question of its being extended to those who ... were 'far closer to the spirit of Christ'
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than the less satisfactory of the disciples. The point is ... only a question of using words so
that we can all understand what is being said. When a man who accepts the Christian
doctrine lives unworthily of it, it is much clearer to say that he is a bad Christian than to
say he is not a Christian." 91 Seeking an incorrigible understanding of the word
"Christian" and of what one is, Lewis emphasizes the representational theory of the
meaning of language, concluding that "obviously a word which we can never apply is not
going to be a very useful word." 92 Lewis concludes that words should represent objects as
descriptions of fact, since trying to "spiritualize" or refine a word beyond its objective,
representational meaning actually lessens the meaning. 93 Thus Lewis shows a clear
preference for the representational theory of language.
Another way to detect Lewis' representational preference is to note his criticism,
or caution, toward the expressivist theory in Studies In Words, where he expresses subtle
doubt that meaning comes from the one who expresses the words. First, he raises the
issue of what he calls "verbicide," or the murder of words: 1) exaggeration or inflation
(i.e. substituting tremendous for great); 2) "verbiage," by which he means "the use of a
word as a promise to pay which is never going to be kept" (i.e.- using significant to
mean absolute); 3) the use of a word as a "party banner" or slogan; and, perhaps the
greatest offender, 4) "the fact that most people are obviously far more anxious to express
their approval and disapproval of things than to describe them. " 94 Hence, words lose their
descriptive quality and increase their evaluative quality. This argument supports the idea
of Lewis' preference for the representational theory of language. Lewis felt that, contrary
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to postmodemism, students should share in the same exploration to attempt to find the
origin of words for the purpose of the more accurate reading of old books, saying dryly
that those seeking to study literature free from philology are "crying for the moon or else
[living] a lifetime of persistent and carefully guarded delusion." 95 Reading poetry with a
non-philological method frees the mind to produce whatever meaning it happens to
consider at the time, and thus the poem becomes the reader's and not the poet's. Lewis
was concerned with mistranslation of a poem or text, and perhaps there is a danger.
However, in agreement with postmodernism and its anti-metanarrative view, Lewis holds
this opinion to be his own and not one that should be forced upon others. 96 In other
words, to each his own.
This is not to say, however, that Lewis thought the meaning of words remains
constant. He acknowledged that meanings do change, like a tree growing new branches
which then grow branches of their own; however, he observed that most speakers
"neither know or care about the tree" and use words without thinking about their
meanings. The danger is that using words mindlessly, to mean whatever one wants them
to mean, can result in the "dumbing down" of language. 97
Next, Lewis concedes that words and language do have emotional nuances, but he
delineates between language that is emotional (arousing emotion) and language that is
emotive (expressive of emotion): "We do not talk only in order to reason or to inform.
We have to make love and quarrel, to propitiate and pardon, to rebuke, console,
intercede, and arouse." 98 However, Lewis felt the emotional meaning does not come from
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the speaker, as an expressivist theorist might suggest, but indirectly from another area.
Language-especially poetic language-does not create emotion itself; instead, it utilizes
the imagination to create the grounds for emotion to express itself. 99 He reiterates this in
Christian Reflections: "I think that Poetic language often expresses emotion not for its
own sake but in order to inform us about the object which aroused the emotion." 100 To
put it another way, words stimulate emotion through imagination. 101
All good writing instructors teach this crucial methodology: show, don't tell.
Lewis expounds on it:
Do you think your readers will believe you just because you say so? You
must go quite a different way to work. By direct description, by metaphor
and simile, by secretly evoking powerful associations, by offering the right
stimuli to our nerves (in the right degree and the right order), and by the
very beat and vowel-melody and length and brevity of your sentences, you
must bring it about that we, we readers, not you, exclaim 'how
mysterious!' or 'loathsome' or whatever it is. Let me taste for myself, and
you'll have no need to tell me how I should react to the flavour. 102
Here Lewis does not directly proclaim his support of the representational theory of
language, but he does challenge the expressivist theory quite extensively and finds it
wanting, especially in its limited ability to communicate emotion to the reader or hearer.
Perhaps it is because ofthis understanding ofthe representational-expressivist theory of
language that Lewis connected so completely with his readers through fiction. Combining
Lewis' representational theory from Mere Christianity and his anti-expressivist side from
Studies In Words puts Lewis at the representational end of the second axis in the MurphyMcClendon model.
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The Reductionistic Axis
Finally, the third axis of modernism is atomism or reductionism. Reductionism
attempts to understand reality by reducing it to its smallest parts. 103 The reductionist
believes that everything is better understood when broken down or reduced in this way.
In science, for instance, water is better understood if examined as a molecule of two parts
hydrogen and one part oxygen. In religion, the gospel is better understood when reduced
to four spiritual laws or eight irrefutable proofs.
Reductionism can be correlated to the shift away from traditional authorities, such
as the church, the government, and the scripture, to the authority of the individual-the
smallest part of the whole. Murphy and McClendon write that this modern approach
"sees the individual as prior to the community, and the community as merely a collection
of like individuals, a mass." 104 Therefore, Murphy and McClendon add a reductionistic
axis, completing their three-dimensional model of modernism. At one pole of the
reductionistic axis is individualism: only the individual can know what is real, and is
therefore given the power to decide for him or herself. The opposite pole is collectivism,
which sees all individuals as interchangeable or expendable. The way that this is
reconciled with the elevated view of the individual is that "Both collectivists and
individualists base their arguments on metaphysical positions, the former claiming that
social wholes, and not their human elements, are the true historical individuals." 105
To define Lewis within this reductionistic axis, the question to ask might be: from
where or whom does Lewis receive his authority? Is it from the scripture, the church, or
the individual rational will? In other words, does authority come from the individual or
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the collective? Even then, this question is not as easy to answer as it might seem. The
paradox of Lewis requires a complex answer.
Looking back on himself as an atheist, Lewis remembers a contempt for all
authority, therefore giving authority only to himself and his own rational will: "But, of
course, what mattered most of all was my deep-seated hatred of authority, my monstrous
individualism, my lawlessness. No word in my vocabulary expressed deeper hatred than
the word Interference. But Christianity placed at the center what seemed to me a
transcendental Interferer." 106 Interestingly, however, he also accepted authority from
poetry. When the poet Yeats mentioned "ever living ones" as ifhe was certain they
existed, and certain that contact between their world and this one was possible, Lewis
was surprised and perplexed: "Here was a pretty kettle of fish. You will understand that
my rationalism was inevitably based on what I believed to be the findings of the sciences,
and those findings, not being a scientist, I had to take on trust-in fact, on authority.
Well, here was an opposite authority. If he had been a Christian I should have discounted
his testimony, for I thought I had the Christians 'placed' and disposed of forever." 107
For the first time, Lewis realized that spirituality was not synonymous with
Christianity, and it was this realization that led him into spiritualism, theosophy,
pantheism and even the occult. However, it also served as the starting point in his journey
toward theism and eventually to Christ. When his evolution was complete, Lewis
continued in many ways to rely on the authority of his own individualism-either his
rational will or his imagination; but he now acknowledged authority from a higher source
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as well. To Lewis the Christian, authority came from many sources, yet all of them
pointed to God.
He struggled, however, with giving authority to the Church-in his case, the
Anglican Church-even after he became a Christian. He disliked the crowds, the noise,
the "perpetual arranging and organizing," and especially the organ, 108 not to mention his
least-favorite thing of all: "What I, like many other laymen, chiefly desire in church are
fewer, better, and shorter hymns; especially fewer." 109 John McTavish writes: "Lewis
started going to church. He sat through sermons and sang ear-grating hymns and did what
he could to bring his fuzzy religion down to earth. Even parish life, however, even
worship, didn't help so much as his trusty old intellect. Once again, then, Lewis' razorsharp mind came to the rescue, slicing through all the religious verbiage until everything
narrowed to a choice between Hinduism and Christianity." 110
He found religion at its richest in small groups with "good men praying alone and
meeting by twos and threes to talk of spiritual matters." 111 Of the church, he wrote, "Thus
my churchgoing was a merely symbolical and provisional practice. If it in fact helped to
move me in the Christian direction, I was and am unaware ofthis." 112 Further, his
marriage to Joy Davidman Gresham created quite a controversy in the church when a
bishop refused to marry them because Gresham was divorced. Lewis' tensions with the
church indicate that he rejected authority from the church, placing it instead with the
individual. For much of his Christian life, as in his early years, Lewis listened to the
authority of his own individual will.
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Authority also came from the Bible for Lewis, although, writing for the
unchurched, he rarely included scripture in his apologetic discussions. He read primarily
out of the New Testament and rarely out ofthe Old. In fact, his only commentary on the
Old Testament is Reflections on the Psalms. But he takes issue with the fundamentalist
view of the authority of scripture, specifically the issue of inerrancy. Approaching the
Bible as a literary critic, he regards it not as "impeccable science or history" but rather as
"an untidy and leaky vehicle." 113 He recognizes narrative from history and concludes, for
example, that Job was not an actual living person and that the creation account is poetic
rather than historical. 114 The Bible, Lewis maintains, "contains good literature and bad
literature. " 115
However, in the stories, poems and histories of the Bible, and even in the surface
imperfections and contradictions, Lewis senses its realness and authority. Though
inerrantists may cringe at them, Lewis' literary criticisms of scripture do not reduce it to
bad literature or something to be discarded, but instead offer proof that scripture is a
narrative account of God: "If ever a myth had become fact, had been incarnated, it would
be just like this." 116 To squeeze the scripture into either an inerrantist' sora literary
critic's view is to squelch its authority and turn it into just another (ordinary) classic. It is
in the sloppy realness of its pages that the narrative's main character is seen and
understood.
Scripture is not the Word of God in the literal sense of a book written perfectly by
a perfect God. Instead, Lewis writes, "It carries the Word of God; and we receive that
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word from it not by using it as an encyclopedia or an encyclical but by steeping ourselves
in its tone or temper and so learning its overall message." 117
Whether as a literary scholar, a layman, an apologist, a lecturer, or a broadcaster,
Lewis sees something sacred and holy in the scriptures. He holds it as a book like none
other and states that no other book makes the kind of claims about itself as does the
Bible. Compare this statement from Lewis the literary critic:
It is, if you like to put it that way, not merely a sacred book but a book so
remorselessly and continuously sacred that it does not invite, it excludes or
repels, the merely aesthetic approach. You can read it as literature only by
a tour de force. You are cutting the wood against the grain, using the tool
for a purpose it was not intended to serve. It demands incessantly to be
taken on its own terms: it will not continue to give literary delight very
long except to those who go to it for something quite different. 118

to this statement from Lewis the Christian layman:
We may observe that the teaching of Our Lord Himself, in which there is
no imperfection, is not given us in that cut-and-dried, fool-proof,
systematic fashion we might have expected or desired. He wrote no book.
We have only reported sayings, most of them uttered in answer to
questions, shaped in some degree by their context. And when we have
collected them all we cannot reduce them to a system. He preaches but He
does not lecture. He uses paradox, proverb, exaggeration, parable, irony;
even the "wisecrack". He utters maxims which, like popular proverbs, if
rigorously taken, may seem to contradict one another. His teaching
therefore cannot be grasped by the intellect alone, cannot be "got up" as if
it were a "subject". If we try to do that with it, we shall find Him the most
elusive of teachers. He hardly ever gave a straight answer to a straight
question. He will not be, in the way we want, "pinned down". The attempt
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Given the tension he experienced with authority and the Church of England
during his Christian years and his high regard for the scripture, particularly as the
mysterious Word of God, Lewis gets his authority from scripture and, even more so, from

117

Lewis, Reflections on the Psalms, 112.
Lewis, Literary Essays, 144.
119
Lewis, Reflections on the Psalms, 112-113.
118

Page 41
his own interpretation of scripture. The Church of England and its traditions did little for
his discipleship, so many of his views of scripture came primarily out of his own study
(and perhaps, to some degree, out of discussions with peers around him such as the
Inklings).
Lewis constantly qualified his apologetics by insisting he was a layman, not a
theologian. Statements such as this might be taken to mean that Lewis did get authority
from others, but it might also confirm that although there are other, more qualified
exegetes of scriptures, he continues to receive his authority from his own interpretations.
Lewis' reliance on the authority of individual interpretation of Scriptures, as well
as his occasional expressed suspicions of the "collective" (in reference to socialism),
would place Lewis on the reductionistic axis of the Murphy-McClendon model toward
the individualism pole. Even the manner in which he presents his apologetics is designed
to appeal to the individual rational will. The argument is given, and one is left to draw
one's own conclusions, right or wrong. In fact, Lewis goes even further in supporting the
authority of the individual's own process: he admonishes others to allow the individual
conclusions to be reached and not to interfere with the individual's process. He writes,
"When you have reached your own room be kind to those who have chosen different
doors and to those who are still in the hall. If they are wrong they need your prayers all
the more; and if they are your enemies, then you are under orders to pray for them. That
is one of the rules common to the whole house."
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For all these reasons, C. S. Lewis appeals to the modern mind and is sometimes
even mistaken for a pure modernist by scholars. When one filters Lewis through the
modern grid, he can pass the test and fit snugly within that model. He is an optimistic
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foundationalist, standing on the shoulders of Immanuel Kant; he supports the
representational theory of language; and he shows his confidence in the individual's
ability to know what is real by appealing directly to personal reason and logic.
Of the three axes in the Murphy-McClendon model, therefore, his position on the
epistemological axis (as an optimistic foundationalist) is perhaps the one which identifies
him most strongly with modernists and causes them-whether critics or supporters-to
include him in their camp. His position on the remaining two axes-the linguistic axis (as
a representational theorist) and the reductionistic axis (as an individualist)-also show
accurately how Lewis fits into modernity. However, as a shift takes place from Lewis the
Modernist to Lewis the Postmodernist, conflicts arise with all three axes, but especially
the latter two.
The point is not to establish that Lewis was a modernist, but to establish and
understand his appeal to modernists. He certainly had a modernist side. However, at the
same time he was highly critical of modernist theologians, who, he says, "by God's
grace, become fewer every day," 121 and even called the extreme modernist an "infidel in
all but name." 122 Again, in The Great Divorce he emphasizes their wrong-headedness
through a modernist character, a Ghost so set on seeking truth through rational inquiry
that he cannot accept the existence of God; he ultimately turns away from the threshold
of heaven. 123
From modernism to postmodernism, the changing worldview has cast a different
shaft of light on previously-held perspectives, including perspectives on Lewis. Yet the
shift only illuminates new delights in his work. Modernism has faded, but Lewis remains
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as golden, if not more golden, than ever. How have the works of C. S. Lewis managed to
shine so gracefully in the new postmodem milieu, when other works from his era have
long since fallen out of print?

The Postmodern Lewis
George Barna implies that Generation X, also known as the Baby Busters (those
born between 1965 and 1985), is the first generation to live entirely within a postmodem
worldview and notes the challenges this new worldview brings: "With most Busters
rejecting notions such as the uniqueness of Christianity, the existence of absolute moral
truth, and the authority of the Bible, there are virtually no restrictions left in place to limit
or guide their thinking about proper personal or corporate spiritual development." 124
Postmodemism is a difficult beast to cage; indeed, it covers many philosophies,
ideas and theories, and any attempt to define it precisely is sure to lead to frustration. It is
more abstract than modernism and resists the clean categorizations that are the very soul
of modernism. Murphy and McClendon, after creating their three-dimensional, three-axes
model of modernism, go on to define postmodemism as "any mode ofthought that
departs from the three modern axes." 125 In other words, postmodernism is anything
besides the three modem axes or anything that might appear in other dimensions as well.
There has been a misconception that postmodernism is a new phenomenon of the
late twentieth century. This may be explained in part by two important events in 1951:
publication of a significant article by W. V. 0. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism,"
which questioned foundationalist bases for knowledge; and the death of Ludwig
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Wittgenstein, whose influential postmodern works on language philosophy were
published posthumously. 126
However, the earliest signs ofpostmodernism appeared during the Enlightenment
with the rise of Friedrich Nietzsche ( 1844-1900), the "patron saint" of postmodernism. 127
Nietzsche became the greatest foe of the Enlightenment, arguing that there is no "true
world" and that no one can really know truth, in the modernist sense. This made
Nietzsche a nihilist, seeing truth more as a function of the internal workings of language
itself than as an external reality. 128
Nietzsche also rejected the Enlightenment's construction of concepts, claiming
that this led to generalizations which missed the point that no two things or occurrences
are identical. For example, Nietzsche saw the Enlightenment's concept of a leaf as a
falsification of the leafs reality. If one looks closely at two leaves that have been lumped
into the same category, as Nietzsche contends, they are in fact very different. 129 To miss
these distinctions by constructing a category is, in a sense, to deny the leafs true reality.
Following Nietzsche, postmodernism picked up steam as the 20th century began. Later,
Jean-Franvois Lyotard (The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge) and Michel
Foucault (The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language, and The Order

of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences), among others, took the baton in the
latter 20th century.
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Cahoone sketches a timeline ofthe spread ofpostmodernity in western society. In
191 7, German philosopher Rudolf Pannwitz coined the term "postmodern" to describe
the nihilism he observed all around him. In the 1930s, Federico de Onis, Bernard Iddings
Bell, and Arnold Toynbee used it to describe, respectively, the backlash against
modernism in literature, the failure of modernism in the realm of religion, and the
phenomenon of the growing working classes surpassing the capitalists in social
significance. By the 1970s and 80s, it described the reaction against modernism in
architecture, philosophy, and even the social and natural sciences, and by the 1990s it
completely infused pop culture and media. 130
Although postmodernism cannot be clearly defined, Cahoone distinguishes it
from modernism in five broad areas: presentation versus representation, origin versus
phenomena, unity versus plurality, transcendence versus immanence, and constitutive
otherness.
Presentation indicates the presence of an object or experience, which in modernity
is considered more reliable than something merely represented by thought or language.
Conversely, representation implies that the thing in question is not truly present, but only
a representation of it-which postmodernity sometimes views as more reliable than its
actual presence: "It [postmodern representationalism] denies that anything is
'immediately present' ... .In some cases, it argues that presentation actually presupposes
representation." 131 Taken to this extreme, representationalism rejects the idea that there is
any objective reality and favors only the subjective representation of what is real. It
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should be noted that this postmodern idea of "representation" is not to be confused with
modernism's representational theory of language.
While there is a place in Christianity for objective discovery and apologetics, this
representational element of postmodernism should, and probably will, force apologetics
back into its rightful place as one of many means of seeking truth and shift emphasis
toward wrestling with the deep, unresolved mysteries of God. Stanley Grenz suggests that
" ... we cannot simply collapse truth into the categories of rational certainty that typify
modernity. Rather, in understanding and articulating the Christian faith, we must make
room for the concept of 'mystery'-not as an irrational complement to the rational but as
a reminder that the fundamental reality of God transcends human rationality." 132
The second concept, origin, has to do with the source-the ultimate foundation.
Modernism interests itself in the source ofthe thing in question. In modernity, the aim of
rational inquiry is to find a common indubitable belief, or foundation, upon which all can
agree, thereby arriving at foundational truth. Cahoone claims that postmodernism, on the
other hand, doubts that it is possible to discover the origins or foundations of anything,
and even doubts that they exist; indeed, if they do exist, they are of no consequence.
Instead, postmodernism takes things at "face value," seeing the surface of thingsphenomena-as requiring no reference to a deeper meaning. Further, in postmodern
literary criticism, the story is the thing-not the author's intentions or meanings, which
are unknowable. 133 It should be noted that this view that the story stands on its own
authority represents a significant shift away from modernity's emphasis on origins,
observations, and empirical proofs to postmodernity's emphasis on personal narrative.
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Third, postmodernism "tries to show that what others have regarded as a unity, a
single, integral existence or concept, is plural," writes Cahoone. "Everything is
constituted by relations to other things, hence nothing is simple, immediate, or totally
present, and no analysis of anything can be complete or final .... [Even] the human self is
not a simple unity ... .It would be more true to say I have selves, than a self." 134
Surprisingly, this postmodern concept of plurality is partially based in modern
structuralism, which perceived that-for example-a culture, while a unity, is also a
network of elements defined in relation to one another. 135
Transcendence, the fourth concept, asserts the existence of societal and natural
values which are above society and nature. In other words, there is such a thing as true
goodness, or nobility, or courage. Postmodernism rebuts this idea by saying that these
norms or values are not transcendent-that is, existing independently of the culture or
processes they prescribe-but immanent-that is, inherent within those cultures and
processes. The postmodern sees every ideal as merely a product of that ideal's own time
and culture, created for particular purposes in a particular context. 136 There is no
standard-such as, perhaps, Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative or even Lewis'
Moral Law-that transcends space and time. It seems that relativism develops out of this
rejection oftranscendence and idealism.
The first four concepts are negative reactions against aspects of modernism; the
fifth, constitutive otherness, is a positive. Postmodernism sees that elements of a unit
maintain unity through an active exclusion of other possible elements. Obvious examples
are: white people maintain their unity by excluding nonwhites; the royal family maintains
134
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its unity by excluding non-royals. In linguistics and philosophy, a language such as
Portuguese maintains its unity or cohesion by being "not" Swedish and "not" Mandarin; a
philosophy such as capitalism maintains cohesion by being "not" communism and "not"
socialism. Apparent unities are "constituted by repressing their ... relations to others."
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Postmodemism seeks to include the excluded and demarginalize the marginalized-for
example, in literary criticism, by sometimes deliberately ignoring well-known themes to
emphasize obscure or even nonexistent ones. 138 Likewise, postmodem theology splinters
into various fragments-feminist theology, African-American theology, Native American
theology-in an attempt to avoid repression or exclusion of"other," previously
marginalized groups.
To understand Lewis' appeal to the postmodern, a somewhat different approach
will be used than was applied to modernism. Plugging Lewis into an existing model is
much less clear-cut and even less desirable when it comes to postmodernism. First, a
major distinction of postmodernism is its rejection of modern constructions.
Postmodernism is defined differently by different people; it is nearly impossible to create
a complete definition or model of this worldview. Second, if a postmodern model could
be successfully constructed, Lewis would not fit as neatly within it as he did in the
modern model.
For example, postmodernism criticizes presentation in favor of representation.
On one hand, Lewis argues against this by stating: "Unless there is some objective
standard of good, over-arching Germans, Japanese and ourselves alike whether any of us
obey it or no, then of course the Germans are as competent to create their ideology as we
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are to create ours." 139 In other words, how can the subjective moral philosophy of the
English be considered superior to that of the Third Reich? Yet there is a sense that it is.
Therefore, Lewis insists that an objective standard does exist.
On the other hand, Lewis makes himself quite comfortable with the postmodem
idea of representation in The Screwtape Letters. Using a bit of subjectivity himself, Lewis
represents data through a reality modified by the thought and language of a demon,
shining it through a unique lens to communicate theology in a creative manner which
modernism would not allow. When the Letters were first published in an Anglican
newspaper, the Guardian, some readers had such difficulty adjusting to this use of
language that one cleric, believing Lewis to be advocating rather than merely
representing evil, wrote to cancel his subscription.
To further explore Lewis' appeal to the postmodern, one must understand several
characteristics that appear to run throughout all the different areas of postmodern studies.
Numerous facets oftwo primary characteristics ofpostmodernism will be examined: antifoundationalism and use of narrative.

Anti-Foundationalism
Perhaps the strongest characteristic of postmodernism is its vehement rejection of
first-principle foundations-that is, the idea that any theory or proposition can be stripped
down to its most foundational element or elements to determine their validity, which in
turn determines the validity of the entire proposition. Postmodernism contends that there
is nothing truly knowable, nor are there any indubitable foundations which, once
"proven," may be relied upon as a basis for belief.
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After earlier showing Lewis to be a foundationalist, delving into this area might
appear contradictory. It cannot be stated that Lewis was an anti-foundationalist,
considering that Mere Christianity is based upon a foundation of Moral Law, and that he
spent much of his earlier years as a scholar defending Christianity by use of
foundationalism. In the same book, however, he states that there are questions "to which I
may never know the answer: if I asked them, even in a better world, I might be answered
as a far greater questioner was answered: 'What is that to thee? Follow thou Me." 140 This
statement alludes to meaning that runs far deeper in significance than supposedly fixed
propositional truths.
Later in his career, however, Lewis seemed to seek something far deeper than
apologetics. He began not only to question foundations but also to doubt that
modernism's epistemological foundationalism was a perfectly reliable highway to truth.
While he cannot be described as totally anti-foundational, through this shift Lewis began
to show hints of anti-foundationalism. These are most notable in the changes he
experienced between his two books on suffering, in his anti-scientism, and in his lifelong
search for Joy.

The Collapse ofFoundations
In 1940, nearly twenty years before he had lost or even met his wife, Lewis
published The Problem of Pain, an attempt to take a reasonable approach to the issue of
suffering by tackling its central dilemma: "If God were good, He would wish to make His
creatures perfectly happy, and if God were almighty, He would be able to do what he
wished. But the creatures are not happy. Therefore God lacks either the goodness, or
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power, or both." 141 Lewis labels these two apparently irreconcilable qualities "Divine
Omnipotence" and "Divine Goodness."
Lewis' premise concerning divine omnipotence begins with gaining a more
accurate understanding of the word "impossible." The reader is reminded by Lewis that
the word is usually followed by an explicit or implicit "unless," indicating that an
impossibility is, in fact, a possibility with help. 142 For example, A is impossible unless B
happens. There are however things which are impossible "under all conditions"intrinsic impossibilities which are not things but nonentities. These impossibilities are
often created by mixing vastly different and sometimes opposite propositions -the
"apples and oranges" problem-in an attempt to disprove something. Thus, when a
question is asked: if God can both create anything and do anything, can he create a
boulder so heavy that he cannot lift it? Lewis calls this kind of argument "selfcontradictory" and says that in no way can such an argument be used to analyze the
attributes or capabilities of God: "His Omnipotence means power to do all that is
intrinsically possible, not to do the intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to
Him, but not nonsense. This is no limit to His power ... .It is no more possible for God
than for the weakest of His creatures to carry out both of two mutually exclusive
alternatives; not because His power meets an obstacle, but because nonsense remains
nonsense even when we talk it about God." 143
Next, the misunderstanding of "Divine Goodness," according to Lewis, is rooted
in-again-an inaccurate word definition. Lewis notes that the "goodness" of God these
days is usually to means "lovingness" and thus "kindness," by which is really meant a
141
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sort of grandfatherly benevolence that desires to see people enjoying themselves. 144
However, Lewis questions the leap from goodness to kindness. After all, does not the
Lord rebuke and discipline those he loves, and cannot that rebuke be seen as loving, even
if not kind in the traditional sense?
In A Horse and His Boy, the unrecognized Asian terrorizes Aravis and Shasta
from behind, chasing their horses and tearing open Aravis' back with his claws. But this
is a two-fold demonstration oflove to Aravis and her friends, as Asian later explains:
only terror could give the exhausted horses enough speed to complete their life-or-death
mission on time, and Aravis also needed to learn the pain she had inflicted unknowingly
on others. 145 Aravis' wound was not an act ofhatred or anger, but one given by a loving
figure in the spirit of discipline, for the growth and highest benefit of the beloved. Surely,
however, this could not be seen as kindness. Love can, in fact, sometimes seem extremely
unkind.
"If God is Love, He is, by definition, something more than mere kindness,"
explains Lewis. "And it appears, from all the records, that though He has often rebuked
us and condemned us, He has never regarded us with contempt. He has paid us the
intolerable compliment of loving us, in the deepest, most tragic, most inexorable
sense." 146
Lewis contends that the Divine definition of "goodness" is more complete and
mature than the human one-for, he argues, the creature cannot have a more accurate
view of goodness than does the Creator:
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The problem of reconciling human suffering with the existence of a God
who loves, is only insoluble so long as we attach a trivial meaning to the
word 'love,' and look on things as if man were the centre ofthem. Man is
not the centre. God does not exist for the sake of man. Man does not exist
for his own sake .... We were made not primarily that we may love God
(though we were made for that too) but that God may love us, that we may
become objects in which the Divine love may rest "well pleased" ...
. . . Divine goodness, therefore, does not mean the excluding of pain and
suffering, but a laboring to mold the beloved into something lovable.
Therefore the purpose of a God who is Love is not to be content with
humanity as it is, but to shape it into something with which he is "wellpleased."147
So Lewis concludes that the presence of suffering in the face of a "good" and
"almighty" God neither contradicts logic, nor disproves the existence of an omnipotent
God: "We can, perhaps, conceive of a world in which God corrected the results of this
abuse of free will by His creatures at every moment: so that a wooden beam became soft
as grass when it was used as a weapon, and the air refused to obey me if I attempted to
set up in it insults. But such a world would be one in which wrong actions were
impossible, and in which, therefore, freedom of the will would be void." 148

The Problem of Pain is Lewis' rational attempt to explain pain to a suffering
world. However, it is incomplete without his second work about pain. After the death of
his wife of four years, Lewis wrote a journal of what he thought and felt in his grief, first
published in 1961 under the pseudonym N. W. Clerk as A Grief Observed. There is no
clearer picture of an open, vulnerable and emotional C. S. Lewis. Whereas The Problem

of Pain was almost an academic exercise in rational objectivity, A Grief Observed was an
emotive, subjective outpouring of grief. Robert Walter Wall notes that many Lewisian
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scholars "start and stop" with the well-reasoned, theological offering of the first book.
However, the latter book rounds out the issue:
The questions of Pain are 'legal' questions, so that suffering is best
subdued by a system of cogent (and perhaps accurate) propositions of
theology and philosophy with their logical conclusions. Yet when Lewis
actually lives within the context of suffering and experiences pain firsthand, as Grief describes, he calls into question the legitimacy of and then
finally extends those very beliefs developed in Pain. Two different
contexts, two different treatments of the problem are brought into a
profound dialectic that provides the reader with a more comprehensive
picture of what is really at stake in human suffering. 149
Clearly, The Problem of Pain presents an understanding of suffering for the modernist
mind; however, A Grief Observed presents that understanding to the postmodem. It is
here that the reader is introduced more fully to the mystical side of C. S. Lewis; it is here
that the once-clear foundations of Lewis' own theology of suffering begin to crumble.
Lewis discovers during this journey that sound reason and unshakeable propositionseven true ones-are not enough.
Biographers have suggested that Lewis' controversial four-year marriage to Joy
Davidman Gresham before her death were among Lewis' happiest years. 150 The couple
were married in Joy's hospital room by a sympathetic minister who performed the
ceremony despite the objections of the Anglican Church, since Joy was a divorcee. The
reason for the marriage was ostensibly so that Joy could remain in Britain after her visa
expired.
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four years and was shattered when she succumbed to cancer in 1960. Joy's son wrote that
Lewis was never quite the same following her death. 152
Lewis is brutally honest in A Grief Observed. The foundations of Divine
Omnipotence versus Divine Goodness crumble in the face ofhis suffering. Though still
seeing God as omnipotent, he could not understand why an all-powerful God would
remove himself from the sufferer's perception. He found himself asking the same
questions that Pain attempted to answer:
Meanwhile, where is God? This is one of the most disquieting symptoms.
When you are happy, so happy that you have no sense of needing Him, so
happy that you are tempted to feel His claims upon you as an interruption,
if you remember yourself and turn to Him with gratitude and praise, you
will be-or so it feels-welcomed with open arms. But go to Him when
your need is desperate, when all other help is vain, and what do you find?
A door slammed in your face, and a sound of bolting and double bolting
on the inside. After that, silence .... Why is He so present a commander in
our time of prosperity and so very absent a help in time oftrouble? 153
Lewis went beyond questions to accusations. In his torment he lashed out at God,
calling him a "Cosmic Sadist," characterized by unreasonableness, vanity, vindictiveness,
injustice, and cruelty. 154 He went on to write: "If God's goodness is inconsistent with
hurting us, then either God is not good or there is no God: for in the only life we know
He hurts us beyond our worst fears and beyond all we can imagine. If it is consistent with
hurting us, then He may hurt us after death as unendurably as before it."
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A foundationalist like Beversluis would see these statements as contradictory.
After all, how could God be perfectly good, according to Moral Law, yet also cruel and
sadistic at the same time?
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Lewis accepted foundationalism, but he also understood that spirituality went
beyond reason and the mind. As he later wrote, spiritual intimacy with God came through
other sources, even suffering: "God has not been trying to experiment on my faith or love
in order to find out their quality. He knew it already. It was I who didn't. In this trial He
makes us occupy the dock, the witness box, and the bench all at once. He always knew
that my temple was a house of cards. His only way of making me realize the fact was to
knock it down." 156
Although Lewis believed in foundations, he realized that there was much more to
God and the Christian life than finding out what those foundations are. There is a place
for foundations, Lewis believed, but that place has its limits. Similarly, postmodemism in
general rejects the rationalistic foundationalism and empirical truth of modernism;
however, this does not deny the existence of truth altogether. Truth comes from other
means. Each of Lewis' two books on suffering is incomplete without the other. The
foundations established in the first do maintain logical validity, but even their validity is
meaningless without the conflicts and mysteries of the second.

Anti-Scientism
Perhaps the strongest characteristic of the postmodern world view is its criticism
of scientism. Rejecting the authority of science as self-evident, postmodernity accepts
instead the authority of narrative and experience. Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard defines
modernism as "any science that legitimates itself with ... an explicit appeal to some grand
narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation
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of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth," and postmodernism simply
as "incredulity toward metanarratives. " 157
Postmodernism reacts strongly against scientific propositions and the belief in the
existence of valid, universal claims. It elevates diversity and finds itself somewhat
intolerant of the idea of a single unity. Where science has gone wrong, Lyotard contends,
is in the misconception that scientific truisms somehow represent the totality of
knowledge. 158 In fact, Lyotard argues that knowledge is categorically different from
science, but is something higher: "Knowledge in general cannot be reduced to science,
nor even to learning. Learning is the set of statements which, to the exclusion of all other
statements, denote or describe objects and may be declared true or false. Science is a
subset of learning." 159 Lyotard calls narration the "quintessential form of customary
knowledge." 160
Scientism has reversed the roles between science and narrative and established
itself as the sole grid through which all knowledge is legitimized. Lyotard responds:
"What I say is true because I prove that it is-but what proof is there that my proof is
true?" 161 In science, however, that proof comes from the scientist (the sender) finding
another (the addressee) to validate the argument, who then in turn becomes the sender to
another. Without this partnership between sender and addressee, verification of the
scientist's statements is impossible. Lyotard suggests, "The truth of the statement and the
competence of its sender are thus subject to the collective approval of a group of persons
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who are competent on an equal basis. Equals are needed and must be created." 162 Note,
however, Lyotard's description ofthe transmission of narrative: "the narrator's only
claim to competence for telling the story is the fact that he has heard it himself. The
current narratee gains potential access to the same authority simply by listening." 163 In
other words, science must use narrative to legitimate itself, transmitting a statement of
truth from the sender to an addressee who in turn becomes an authority merely by telling
the story. Lyotard explains that knowledge "includes notions of 'know-how,' 'knowing
how to live', 'how to listen', etc. Knowledge, then, is a question of competence that goes
beyond the simple determination and application of the criterion of truth, extending to the
determination and application of criteria of efficiency, of justice and/or happiness, of the
beauty of a sound or color, etc." 164
Lewis seems to echo Lyotard's argument against scientism and frequently targets
it in both essays and fiction. 165 His small tolerance for scientism as a metanarrative is
illustrated with great humor and clarity through Weston, the scientist caricature in the
Space Trilogy. Evidently the name "Weston" represents western civilization and some of
its many flaws: in the first book, western rationalism, and in the second, western
materialism, as the Un-Man tempts the Lady of Perelandra with "beautiful things." 166
Weston represents all that Lewis finds wrong with scientism; he worships empirical data
and sees the survival of the human race as completely contingent upon the advancement
of science. Consider his arrogant justification of his actions to Oyarsa, a type of Godfigure:
162
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"To you I may seem a vulgar robber, but I bear on my shoulders the destiny of the
human race. Your tribal life with its stone-age weapons and bee-hive huts, its primitive
coracles and elementary social structure, has nothing to compare with our civilizationwith our science, medicine and law, our armies, our architecture, our commerce, and our
transport system which is rapidly annihilating space and time. Our right to supercede you
is the right of the higher over the lower." 167
In taking this stance, Weston completely fails to comprehend that the inhabitants
of the planet have something important to say. Ransom, however, lives with them and
learns their language and culture. Only then does he truly understand the purpose of
Oyarsa's calling upon him. In translating the narrative of the planet from Oyarsa (the
sender), Ransom (the addressee) becomes the sender to Weston and Devine and thus
becomes the authority. 168 This pattern parallels the postmodern idea that knowledge and
authority come through narrative.
By contrast, Lewis exposes the limits of science and its primary tool of
observation. The scientists, hearing Oyarsa's voice and not knowing its source, observe a
nearby hross with closed eyes and hypothesize that it must be a witch doctor in a trance,
performing ventriloquism to create the voice. Weston then makes a ridiculous speech
designed to intimidate the hross, complete with wild threats and hilarious posturing. With
dry wit, Lewis observes: "On Weston's hypothesis his action ought to have been
impressive. Unfortunately for him, no one else shared his theory of the elderly hross' s
behavior." 169 The hross turns out to be asleep. Weston's misplaced trust in science, and
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who are competent on an equal basis. Equals are needed and must be created." 162 Note,
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current narratee gains potential access to the same authority simply by listening." 163 In
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truth from the sender to an addressee who in turn becomes an authority merely by telling
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beyond the simple determination and application of the criterion of truth, extending to the
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illustrated with great humor and clarity through Weston, the scientist caricature in the
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"To you I may seem a vulgar robber, but I bear on my shoulders the destiny of the
human race. Your tribal life with its stone-age weapons and bee-hive huts, its primitive
coracles and elementary social structure, has nothing to compare with our civilizationwith our science, medicine and law, our armies, our architecture, our commerce, and our
transport system which is rapidly annihilating space and time. Our right to supercede you
is the right of the higher over the lower." 167
In taking this stance, Weston completely fails to comprehend that the inhabitants
of the planet have something important to say. Ransom, however, lives with them and
learns their language and culture. Only then does he truly understand the purpose of
Oyarsa's calling upon him. In translating the narrative of the planet from Oyarsa (the
sender), Ransom (the addressee) becomes the sender to Weston and Devine and thus
becomes the authority. 168 This pattern parallels the postmodern idea that knowledge and
authority come through narrative.
By contrast, Lewis exposes the limits of science and its primary tool of
observation. The scientists, hearing Oyarsa' s voice and not knowing its source, observe a
nearby hross with closed eyes and hypothesize that it must be a witch doctor in a trance,
performing ventriloquism to create the voice. Weston then makes a ridiculous speech
designed to intimidate the hross, complete with wild threats and hilarious posturing. With
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in his own powers of observation and deduction, makes him the laughingstock of all the
onlookers. In this way Lewis clearly shows the limitations of scientism.
In Perelandra, Weston goes beyond proclaiming science as the hope and
salvation of humanity to deifying science as the totality of knowledge. "In so far as I am
the conductor of the central forward pressure of the universe, I am it. Do you see, you
timid, scruple-mongering fool? I am the universe. I, Weston, am your God and your
Devil." 170 Interestingly, the moment Weston states this, he finds himself physically used
as a tool of evil, transformed into the demonic Un-Man.
In fact, much of Lewis' mistrust of scientism and its conquest appears almost
more prophetic than critical when, for example, Feverstone in That Hideous Strength
exalts science as the savior of humanity: "If Science is really given a free hand it can now
take over the human race and re-condition it: make man a really efficient animal. If it
doesn't-well, we're done." 171
Lewis' anti-scientism zeal shows through his essays as well. In The Abolition of
Man, he expresses concern with the conquest of nature and subsequent dehumanization
of humanity. He argues:
We reduce things to mere Nature in order that we may "conquer" them.
We are always conquering Nature, because "Nature" is the name for what
we have, to some extent, conquered. The price of conquest is to treat a
thing as mere Nature. Every conquest over Nature increases her domain.
The stars do not become Nature till we can weigh and measure them; the
soul does not become Nature till we can psycho-analyse her. The wresting
of powers from Nature is also the surrendering of things to Nature ... as
soon as we take the final step of reducing our own species to the level of
mere Nature, the whole process is stultified, for this time the being who
stood to gain and the being who has been sacrificed are one and the
same. 172
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However, a distinction is made between science and scientism, the latter being
seen as the underlying force behind modernism. Postmodern scholar Walter Truett
Anderson defines scientism merely as "the worship of facts," whereas science, properly
understood, is "the constant attempt to falsify one's hypotheses and find better ones." 173
Michael Aeschliman says that scientism is "a misuse of science ... the misapplication of
scientific method" because it acknowledges only what is observable. 174 Thomas C. Peters
says scientism is neither the careful empirical methods nor the wonderfully beneficial
discoveries of true science, but a "unique combination of atheism, materialist philosophy,
evolutionism, hostility to religion, and doctrinaire adherence to the universal validity of
the scientific method." 175 Carnell suggests that the sin of Weston and Devine is "not in
their method but in trying to use that method out of its proper place." 176 In That Hideous
Strength, among other places, Lewis makes this distinction explicit: "The physical
sciences, good and innocent in themselves, had already, even in Ransom's own time,
begun to be warped, had been subtly manoeuvred in a certain direction. Despair of
objective truth had been increasingly insinuated into the scientists; indifference to it, and
a concentration upon mere power, had been the result." 177
Apparently Lewis was concerned that scientism was corrupting the innocence of
science in the name of power and progress. He looked beyond the temporal and
envisioned science conquering not just the earth but other worlds as well. That Hideous
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Strength shows science without God or morals, manipulating systems and experimenting
on children and criminals. 178 Scientists and ethicists may debate whether Lewis' concerns
were valid. However, they cannot debate that he had them.

Sehnsucht and the Search for Joy
A common thread throughout C. S. Lewis' life was his search for Joy-a mystical
search which appeals to the postmodern mind, and the third aspect of his antifoundationalist streak. While Lewis argued much of his apologetics from a
foundationalist standpoint, seeking to prove incorrigible foundations for Christianity did
not fill a void in his life; from his earliest years he believed there was more to learn and
understand. This journey was a mystical one, perhaps best described in The Pilgrim's

Regress. 179
Lewis' concept of Joy was certainly not based on foundationalism. He made no
propositional statements, no clinical diagnoses to define it. In fact, he could only describe
it as "an unsatisfied desire which is itself more desirable than any other satisfaction"
characterized by "the fact that anyone who has experienced it will want it again." 180 He
even called it "something quite different from ordinary life ... something, as they would
now say, 'in another dimension .... "' 181 This parallels the view of Murphy and
McClendon that postmodernism admits to dimensions outside of their three-axis, threedimensional model. Indeed, Lewis attempted to explain something that could not be
placed anywhere within the model of modernity.
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Lewis called it Sehnsucht-a German word for a keen, poignant longing or
yearning, similar to nostalgia in that it implies alienation from what is desired.

182

There is

more to the word than mere representation of an intangible object; defining sehnsucht this
way excludes emotion and experience from its meaning and fails to capture the sense of
the word. Sehnen is the German root, meaning "to long for" or "to yearn after", and sucht
indicates sickness, passion, or rage 183-that is, an almost unbearable intensity of emotion.

Sehnsucht denotes a passion behind the longing, a homesickness for a place not visited in
many years.
Lewis first experienced Joy-this sharp pang of longing-as a "memory of a
memory":
As I stood beside a flowering currant bush on a summer day there
suddenly arose in me without warning, and as if from a depth not of years
but of centuries, the memory of that earlier morning at the 0 ld House
when my brother had brought his toy garden into the nursery. It is difficult
to find words strong enough for the sensation which came over me ... .It
was a sensation, of course, of desire, but desire for what? Not, certainly,
for a biscuit tin filled with moss, nor even (though that came into it) for
my own past ... and before I knew what I desired, the desire itself was
gone .... IM
His second experience with Joy came as he read Squirrel Nutkin by Beatrix
Potter: "It troubled me with what I can only describe as the Idea of Autumn. It sounds
fantastic to say that one can be enamored of a season, but that is something like what
happened .... And one went back to the book, not to gratify the desire but to reawake
it." 185 He recognized again that this experience was of great importance.
His third came while reading about the death of Balder in Longfellow's Saga of

King Olaf "I knew nothing about Balder; but instantly I was uplifted into huge regions of
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northern sky, [and] I desired with almost sickening intensity something never to be
described ... and then, as in the other examples, found myself at the very same moment
already falling out of that desire and wishing I were back in it." 186
Lewis cautions the reader that although these three experiences might seem
trivial, they are in fact the central basis for his life. It is through this search for Joy that he
eventually comes into a relationship with Christ: if not for these experiences, he might
have missed the experience of salvation altogether. 187
The remainder of Lewis' life, at least up to his Christian conversion, was driven
by his search for Joy-a series of mountaintops and valleys, finding that intense pang,
losing it, and then trying to find it again.
As a teenager, Lewis thought Joy was driving him toward sex, which he later
learned had nothing to do with Joy. In fact, his experiments with sexual self-fulfillment
had the opposite effect on Lewis: the cycle of temptation, guilt, and fierce prayers for
deliverance which appeared to go unanswered contributed to his subsequent loss of faith
as a young man. 188
Lewis also sought Joy in magic and the occult, which he describes almost like a
powerful drug addiction: "It is a spiritual lust; and like the lust of the body it has the fatal
power of making everything else in the world seem uninteresting while it lasts. It is
probably this passion, more even than the desire for power, which makes magicians." 189
Lewis later cautions that Joy is not to be confused with a thrill, as he had described in his
occultic phase: "Only when your whole attention and desire are fixed on something
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else-whether a distant mountain, or the past, or the gods of Asgard-does the 'thrill'
arise. It is a by-product. Its very existence presupposes that you desire not it but
something other and outer. If by any perverse askesis or the use of any drug it could be
produced from within, it would at once be seen to be of no value. For take away the
object, and what, after all, would be left?-a whirl of images, a fluttering sensation in the
diaphragm, a momentary abstraction."

190

Lewis eventually came to realize that Joy was a desire for something else,
something beyond itself Interestingly, in one of his foundationalist-based books, he
declares that the object of Joy's desire is God alone: "He Himself is the fuel our spirits
were designed to burn, the food our spirits were designed to feed on. There is no other.
That is why it is just no good asking God to make us happy in our own way without
bothering about religion. God cannot give us a happiness and peace apart from Himself,
because it is not there." 191
Lewis' Joy was beyond the realm of modernism-inexplicable, uncategorizable.
There is nothing in either expressivist or representational language to describe it; it must
be experienced. Joy does not mesh well with the maxims of foundationalism. Instead, it is
found in the mystery embraced by postmodernism, a mystical thing which can be known
only by experience.
Lewis avidly pursued Joy in nature, art, literature and mythology, but these also
turned up empty; until at last, through George Macdonald's Phantastes, the concept of
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holiness entered his definition of Joy-and, over the next decade, he came to understand
that "what he really wanted ... was to merge with the Absolute." 192
At the end of his autobiography, Lewis explains the outcome of his quest for Joy.
While his whole life was based on seeking it, Joy lost its importance once he converted to
Christianity. Lewis claimed that although the "old stab" of Joy came to him with the
same frequency and intensity after his conversion as before, it took on a different role. He
writes, "It was valuable only as a pointer to something other and outer. While that other
was in doubt, the pointer naturally loomed large in my thoughts." 193 Lewis' spirituality
was not based on reason. When he struggled with doubt, his assurance came not from
well-considered propositions, but from that longing which pointed to the Creator. Joy had
become the assurance Lewis needed in his spiritual journey.
In summary, though Lewis defended Christianity from a foundational standpoint,
he was not a foundationalist in the modernist sense of the word. Through the death of his
wife, his early foundationalist explanations collapsed. The very answers he gave in The
Problem of Pain, he found himself questioning in A Grief Observed. Nevertheless,
through his grief, Lewis passed a spiritual milestone in his faith-a depth that could
never be achieved through rational observations and theology lessons.
Next, Lewis questioned the ability of science to reveal all knowledge and
expressed a serious mistrust of scientism. This questioning can be seen as somewhat
blasphemous to modernism's primary religion: an amoral scientism. His reservations can
be found through the full spectrum of his writings, and he constantly raises concerns
about science's conquest of nature and dehumanization of people.
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The third anti-foundational aspect of Lewis is more positive in nature: a belief
that there is something more than mere foundations, namely the transcendent experience
he called Joy. He portrays God as a chess master who used this longing for Joy to draw
Lewis to himself, and eventually to faith in Christ, who is the object of Joy.
Through these three aspects of anti-foundationalism, Lewis questioned the blackand-white foundations of modernism. He saw more gray areas and acknowledged the
mysteries of life and nature, as well as the supernatural.

Lewis' Use of Narrative

Story arose as a result ofpostmodernism's rejection ofthe "Enlightenment
hubris" 194 with its three metanarratives-rationalism, scientism and consumerism. 195
Grenz says:
As the twentieth century unfolded, anthropologists became increasingly
aware ofthe foundational importance of myths in human society. Some
scholars argued that myths are more than just stories that primitive
cultures tell; in fact, they embody the central core of a culture's values and
beliefs and are in that sense fundamentally religious .... Postmodern
thinkers speak of these systems oflegitimizing myths as 'narratives' (or
'metanarratives'). They contend that a narrative exercises a force apart
from argumentation and proof and, in fact, that it provides the principal
means by which every community legitimates itself. 196
Early in his autobiography, Lewis shows this emphasis on individual story. He
claims his early experiences of Joy so defined his personal story that if the reader finds no
interest in them, there is no point in reading further.
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The authority of knowledge in postmodernism comes not from empirical evidence
or logical argument, but from the narrator herself. Lyotard states that narrative is
comprised of three parts: the sender, the addressee and the hero. At one point, the sender
(narrator) is the addressee (narratee) as the story is transmitted to her. The fact that she
has heard the story is what gives her authority; she now becomes the authority on the
story merely because she has heard it herself. 198
In the Screwtape Letters, Lewis uses this same technique with a twist. The reader
eavesdrops as the sender, Screwtape, transmits knowledge to the addressee, Wormwood.
In this way the reader becomes a kind of secondary or invisible addressee, who gains
knowledge of demons and their plan, and thus also becomes an authority.
As the narrator of the Narnia Chronicles, Lewis often interrupts the story to
comment to the addressee. For example, in Voyage of the Dawn Treader, as Eustace
stumbles into a dragon's lair, Lewis quips: "Most of us know what we should expect to
find in a dragon's lair, but, as I said before, Eustace had read only the wrong books." 199
Here Lewis is the sender of the story, the reader is the addressee and Eustace is the
object. Lewis claims to know about dragons simply because he has read the right books,
and assumes the reader has too. If the reader is not already an authority on dragons, he
will be after hearing Lewis' story. Eustace, on the other hand, knows nothing because has
not heard the stories. Although the point of the book is not to make the reader an expert
on dragons but to expose Eustace's fundamental character flaw (that is, his dragonish
heart), this wry, charming passage delivers a powerful point which underscores that
authority is transmitted through story.
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Story is what legitimizes authority in the postmodern context. The modernist may
"prove" scientifically that dragons are not real, but to the postmodernist, such proofs do
not necessarily constitute complete knowledge. In postmodernism, authority is not based
on rational proofs but is passed from sender to addressee through story. The sender
transmits the story to the addressee, who now has the authority and competence to
become a sender of the story.
Though this example is from a children's fantasy, it shows Lewis' understanding
of the power of story to impart knowledge. Postmodernism had just been born when the
Narnia Chronicles were written; however, this is what makes Lewis such an interesting
paradigm for the modern-postmodern transitional age. He never completely fit the mold
of modernism, and postmodernism was too new for him to align himself with it
consciously in his lifetime. However, he was a master storyteller with a brilliant
imagination. It is less likely that Lewis decided to adopt postmodernism than that he
simply transcended it-especially in the way he communicated the story of Christianity
through narrative.

The Three Acts ofStory and Mystery
Story is, in essence, a three-act play: a beginning, a middle and an end. 200
Macintyre sees human life or selfhood as a "concept of self whose unity resides in the
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unity of a narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to
end. "201 He notes this pattern of story in all things human:
Indeed a conversation is a dramatic work, even if a very short one, in
which the participants are not only the actors, but also the joint authors,
working out in agreement or disagreement the mode of their production.
For it is not just that conversations belong to genres in just the way that
plays and novels do; but they have beginnings, middles and endings just as
do literary works. They embody reversals and recognitions; they move
towards and away from climaxes. There may within a longer conversation
be digressions and subplots, indeed digressions within digressions and
subplots within subplots. But if this is true of conversations, it is true also
mutates mutandis ofbattles, chess games, courtships, philosophy
seminars, families at the dinner table, businessmen negotiating contractsthat is, of human transactions in general. 202
Life and knowledge consist not of absolute foundations, but of individual stories.
Scripture, in a postmodern worldview, is seen as narrative and not a book of systematic,
categorized doctrines and theologies. Modernism has effectively reduced the Bible to a
series of propositions and thus trivialized the Christian faith. Interestingly, however, the
Bible seems to fit more comfortably in the postmodern worldview, as a presentation of
God's story, than in the modern worldview as a book of truisms and maxims. Trevor Hart
writes: "It is the story of God's dealings with his world and with his creatures in and
through the particular histories of Israel and Jesus the Christ. It is this story-the gospel
or good news focused in Jesus-upon the basis of which the church today fashions its
identity, and in conformity to the contours of which it seeks to live its life. To be a
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Christian is in some sense to have one's own story shaped in a decisive way by and taken
up into this other larger story of God's redemptive action in the world. " 203
Like all stories, the Bible also asserts a theme. It is a book of the human
condition, a collection of human stories making up the larger story of God's redemption.
There is always a beginning, middle and end. The author of Ecclesiastes sums up the
human story in seven verses, first by very briefly acknowledging the beginning and the
end ("a time to be born and a time to die"), and then using the remaining verses to
describe the middle (3:2-8). In the Bible story, the first act begins definitively with n'iPWlil

-berosheet-"in the beginning." At the other end of the story, Revelation describes in
symbolism and metaphor the end of the biblical narrative. There is a divine proclamation
in Revelation 22:21-"va(, EPXOflal Taxu" ("Yes! I am coming soon!") and a response
"A[l~V,

Epxou KUPLE'lr]CJoD" ("Amen, Come Lord Jesus!"). Thus, the Bible story ends.
There is an unwritten rule of storytelling: begin the story as close to the action as

possible. Bring the story as close to the present (read: the middle) as possible. Too much
detail not only bores the recipient but also lessens the intrigue of the story. A great
storyteller finds wealth in mystery. An effective story's opening and closing chapters
have little to say. Unanswered questions and darkened comers of the past deepen the
story and cause wonder. Predictability provides little reason to progress, and interest in
the story remains on a shallow level. Unpredictability is a good rule of thumb for the
beginning novelist, a guideline which might well have been inspired by the
unpredictability of the human story.
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The great mystery of story lies in the beginning and the end. Much time, money
and energy has been spent asking the unanswerable questions, "Where did I come from?
Why am I here? Where am I going?" Wilkinson explains:
Even when we know the main details of our lives-which most of us domost of us have entertained the possibility that there might be more: that if
there isn't some mystery about us, there ought to be. Perhaps this is
because the details themselves aren't enough to match the depth we feel
within us .... Our own memory emerges out of the mist. We don't
remember much at all of the things which shaped us. We know our past by
hearsay, and pictures in old photo albums. But direct memory of the first
part of our individual stories is not available to us. 204
Perhaps, Wilkinson ponders, this is why people are so fascinated by adopted
children, or amnesiacs searching to fill the unknown gaps in their lives.
The Great Divorce also follows the postmodern pattern of story, especially in the

way it begins and ends in mystery. At the very beginning, the narrator finds himself
inexplicably standing in a bus queue "by the side of a long, mean street," observing the
darkened gray city around him. The sense is surreal because he does not know how he
got there, but he does not question it and immediately begins participating in the story.
Even then, the images are not concrete. The narrator "seems" to be standing there; time
has paused, and he can discern little about the strange city or the other people in the
queue, except that they tend to be negative, reluctant to wait, and unhappy. When the bus
does arrive and the people board it, the narrator and the reader still have no knowledge of
its purpose, origin, or destination. 205
The ending is just as mysterious: the narrator suddenly snaps out of slumber to the
striking of a clock and the wailing of a siren? 06 Nothing more is said. No chapter is added
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to tell what the narrator did about the dream after waking, nor how it changed him or his
life. The end of the narrator's story remains a mystery, despite new revelations
discovered within the dream.
Mystery is found throughout the Narnia Chronicles as well. Originally, The Lion,
the Witch, and the Wardrobe was the first book of the series, published in 1950. From
this story, the reader has no knowledge about the wardrobe. How has it come to be a
doorway into Narnia? How does it link Narnia to England? For that matter, what is the
background of Professor Digory, the owner of the house with the wardrobe? The reader
suspects Digory knows something about the wardrobe when Lucy's tales ofNarnia are
challenged by her siblings, and Digory points out that logic supports Lucy's story: "There
are only three possibilities. Either your sister is telling lies, or she is mad, or she is telling
the truth. You know she doesn't tell lies and it is obvious that she is not mad. For the
moment then and unless any further evidence turns up, we must assume that she is telling
the truth." 207 Professor Digory's use of reason to support the possibility of realities
beyond reason echoes Lewis' argument for the existence of God in Mere Christianity.
To the very end of this book, Lewis offers no explanation about the mystery of
the wardrobe. Not until he publishes The Magician's Nephew in 1955 (which in later
printings becomes the first of the Narnia Chronicles) is the origin of the wardrobe is
revealed as made from a tree that had been brought back from Narnia and had grown in
Digory's backyard. Even then, though Lewis explained the mystery behind the wardrobe,
he introduces a whole new mystery to the origin issue: where did Digory's magician
uncle get the magic rings that first send Digory to Narnia? That riddle is never solved.
The beginning and end remain mysteries.
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Another great mystery concerns Reepicheep, the talking mouse, whose story is
told in The Voyage of the Dawn Treader. He first appears in Prince Caspian as if from
nowhere; his origins, like most characters in these and other stories, are never revealed,
although it is hinted that his ancestors freed Asian by chewing off the ropes that bound
him on the Stone Table in The Lion, The Witch, and The Wardrobe. Reepicheep, one of
the most humorous of all Lewis' characters, is brave, bold, and fiercely loyal to Caspian
and to Narnia. However, one thing surpasses even this allegiance: his desire to meet
Asian at the end of the world. When finally the seafaring children reach the Last Sea, he
says his goodbyes, paddles to the place where the world ends, and vanishes over the edge.
"Since that moment," concludes Lewis, "no one can truly claim to have seen Reepicheep
the Mouse. But my belief is that he came safe to Asian's country and is alive there to this
,208
day.

Postmodernism is less concerned with origins than with the middle of the story.
While there is a teleological consideration in narrative-that the story is taking the person
somewhere-efforts to discover that destination are secondary to where the person is
now. Postmodernism focuses on the middle, on attempting to understanding what story a
person is a part of.
The conclusion of this story has yet to take place; in "real life," Christianity finds
itself still in the middle of the Bible story. As the church lives in the middle of the Bible
story, individuals live in the middle of their own stories. Wilkinson writes, "To be in the
middle is the human condition .... [F]inding oneself in the middle of a story whose end is a
mystery is not a unique or vaguely shameful situation. It is the situation we all are in:
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middled, and muddled-in the middle of a story, in the middle ofajourney."209 Being in
the middle creates in the participants a struggle to understand their own individual roles,
as well as the role they might play in another's story. Macintyre explains:
We enter upon a stage which we did not design and we find ourselves part
of an action that was not of our making. Each of us being a main character
in his own drama plays subordinate parts in the dramas of others, and each
drama constrains the others. In my drama, perhaps, I am Hamlet or Iago or
at least the swineherd who may yet become a prince, but to you I am only
A Gentleman or at best Second Murderer, while you are my Polonius or
my Gravedigger, but your own hero. Each of our dramas exerts constraints
on each other's, making the whole different from the parts, but still
dramatic. 210
The tension ofliving one's own story while relating to others' stories adds depth
to a story. Wilkinson says that as individuals "we want to see our lives as part of a larger
story. Our great question therefore is to find out what story we are in and what our place
in it is ... We find ourselves in the middle of a story-but what story?" 211
Macintyre argues that the quest to solve life's mystery shapes and strengthens
character. "It is in the course of the quest and only through encountering and coping with
the various particular harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which provide any
quest with its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is finally to be understood.
A quest is always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in selfknowledge." 212
Macintyre sees two elements within the mystery of story that fuel these quests:
unpredictability and teleological character: "Like characters in a fictional narrative we do
not know what will happen next, but nonetheless our lives have a certain form which
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projects itself towards our future." Concerning unpredictability, he states, "It is crucial
that at any given point in an enacted dramatic narrative we do not know what will happen
next." 213 Why? Because, in story, there needs to be progression, a process that is directed
toward an end. A predictable book will lie unfinished; there is no desire to continue to
read ifthe story is already known. In the human story, Macintyre argues: "We live out
our lives, both individually and in our relationships with each other, in the light of certain
conceptions of a possible shared future, a future in which certain possibilities beckon us
forward and others repel us, some seen already foreclosed and others perhaps inevitable.
There is no present which is not informed by some image of some future and an image of
the future which always presents itself in the form of a telos--or of a variety of ends or
goals-toward which we are either moving or failing to move in the present."214 Madan
Sarup ponders these elements by looking back on the life story:
In our reflections we consider what the possible paths were, and what
would have happened if we had chosen them. What would have happened
ifl had said 'yes'? What ifl hadn't done that? We still ask these questions
even if nothing can be done about these decisions taken so many years
ago. We still ask these questions even though we know that we can never
know what the 'right' decision would have been. We often consider
alternatives, but we do not continue to explore imaginatively all the
bifurcating paths. 215
Grenz urges that the church "must make room for the concept of 'mystery'-not
as an irrational complement to the rational but as a reminder that the fundamental reality
of God transcends human rationality." Later, he adds, "Central to our task in thinking
through the faith in a postmodern context is an obligation to rethink the function of
assertions of truths or propositions. We must continue to acknowledge the fundamental
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importance of rational discourse, but our understanding of the faith must not remain
fixated on the propositionalist approach that views Christian truths as nothing more than
correct doctrine or doctrinal truth."

216

It is this mystery that gives meaning to a person's

story, and thus to the person's life. It shapes identity. Marva Dawn describes a key
component to the church's mission to the postmodem world: "One great challenge for
people in our times is the lack of genuine story, one that is coherent and gives meaning to
their lives. " 217

Redemption and Narrative Convergence
Whether postmodems know it or not, God is the author and ultimate goal of their
stories-the "larger story" they are seeking. Macdonald explains, "The danger is that we
stop at the initial point of contact, rather than helping people to see that their felt needs
are symptoms of a greater need-the need for redemption." 218 That need for redemption
climaxes in the center of God's story with a narrative convergence between God and
humanity, the Incarnation. Through Christ, God transcends distant natural laws and
involves himself directly in the story of each individual. Lewis' most profound example
of this narrative convergence is in the Narnia Chronicles.
To the postmodem, each person is the owner of his or her own story, and no story
is seen as greater than the other. There is no grand metanarrative that transcends all other
stories; each person's story is independent.
Lewis illustrates this masterfully in A Horse and His Boy, the story of a desperate
mission to save Namia from military occupation. The hero is lost in despair on a dark
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road when suddenly Asian appears, walking with him and telling his story: "I was the
lion who forced you to join with Aravis. I was the cat who comforted you among the
houses of the dead. I was the lion who drove the jackals from you while you slept. ... And
I was the lion you do not remember who pushed the boat in which you lay, a child near
death, so that it came to shore where a man sat, wakeful at midnight, to receive you."
However, when Shasta inquires about Aravis' life, Asian replies, "I am telling you your
story, not hers. I tell no one any story but his own."219
Later, Asian comes to Aravis to explain her story: "The scratches on your back,
tear for tear, throb for throb, blood for blood, were equal to the stripes laid on the back of
your stepmother's slave because ofthe drugged sleep you cast upon her. You needed to
know what it felt like." But when Aravis asks what became of the slave, Asian responds
again, "I am telling you your story, not hers. No one is told any story but their own." 220
While emphasizing individual stories in the Narnia Chronicles, Lewis is equally
effective at illustrating narrative convergence, when God's story comes down and blends
with each person's own story. Throughout the books, Asian's story continually converges
with the characters' own stories. In The Voyage of the Dawn Treader, he appears only in
Eustace's story to remove the skin of the dragon which Eustace had become. 221 In The

Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe, he dies to pay for the sins of one-Edmund-and
salvation is presented not on a grand scale but on an intimate, individuallevel. 222 In

Prince Caspian, he appears only to Lucy while she is still with the others: "I can see him
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all the time," she states to Edmund. "He's looking straight at us." 223 The rest of the group
fails to see Asian, though he is standing among them.
The Narnia Chronicles illustrate the redemption that comes as a result of this
narrative convergence between God's and a human's stories. In this way, Lewis shows
that although Christ died for the whole world, in a deeper sense redemption is an
individual event, rather than an archetypical event to redeem a faceless global
community. Though there are many accounts of redemption in the Narnia Chronicles,
two stand out among the rest: the convergence of Aslan with the characters of Edmund
and Eustace.
In The Lion, The Witch, and The Wardrobe, Asian strikes a deal with the White
Witch for the soul of Edmund the traitor, and as a result Asian must be sacrificed. The
crucifixion is beautifully pictured in this children's tale as Asian willingly surrenders to
the witch and her army, allowing himself to be bound upon an altar and finally run
through with a sword. However, Asian comes back to life, much to the children's thrilled
astonishment.
"But what does it all mean?'' asked Susan when they were
somewhat calmer.
"It means," said Asian, "that though the Witch knew the Deep
Magic, there is a magic deeper still which she did not know. Her
knowledge goes back only to the dawn of time. But if she could have
looked a little further back, into the stillness and the darkness before Time
dawned, she would have read there a different incantation. She would
have known that when a willing victim who had committed no treachery
was killed in a traitor's stead, the Table would crack and Death itself
would start working backward. " 224
In this scene, Lewis offers certainly one of the clearest literary examples ever
written of atonement and grace. Soteriology is explained not as a series of propositions in
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a theologian's treatise. The workings are presented by Lewis in a narrative as an example
of convergence of the stories of the divine and humanity. Here the reader can understand
how Christ's death relates to the individual on a personal and intimate level.
While Edmund's story explains Asian's act ofredemption, Eustace's focuses on
the result of this act upon a person. In The Voyage of the Dawn Treader, Eustace, through
his own greed and selfishness, has turned into a dragon. He is disconsolate because he
can neither communicate with the other children nor fit into their boat, which is his only
chance of returning home. As if in a vision, Asian appears and tells him to peel off his
dragon-skin, which he tries in vain to do. Finally Aslan offers to do it for him: "The very
first tear he made was so deep that I thought it had gone right into my heart. And when he
began pulling the skin off, it hurt worse than anything I've ever felt. The only thing that
made me able to bear it was just the pleasure of feeling the stuff peel off. ,ms
The narrator goes on to wrap up the work of Aslan upon Eustace's body and
character. "It would be nice, and fairly nearly true, to say that 'from that time forth
Eustace was a different boy.' To be strictly accurate, he began to be a different boy. He
had relapses. There were still many days when he could be very tiresome. But most of
those I shall not notice. The cure had begun." 226 Indeed Eustace goes on to appear as a
primary character and hero in the final two books ofNarnia-definitely a changed young
man.
Edmund and Eustace illustrate the theme of redemption in the Narnia Chronicles.
In these children's fantasies, Lewis uses narrative imaginatively to communicate the
saving grace of Christ, so that even the casual reader might understand.
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In The Great Divorce, the theme of sinful bondage and redemption is revisited
when an Angel meets a Ghost with a lizard on his shoulder. At first, the Ghost seems to
control lizard, but soon it is clear that the lizard is in control. The Angel asks over and
over again to kill the lizard, but the Ghost gives many excuses: he wants the advice of a
doctor, he wants to discuss it later, he fears its removal might kill him, and he fears it will
hurt too much (note the presence of pain in redemption in this example and in the
example of Eustace). When the Ghost finally lets the Angel kill it, the Ghost becomes a
man of glorious substance and the lizard a beautiful stallion, which he mounts and rides
off toward the distant mountains. 227
The difference between Lewis' apologetic works and his imaginative works might
be defined this way: when he wanted to defend the gospel, he used reason and
argument-but when he wanted to communicate the gospel, he used story. Indeed, Lewis
harnessed the power of story to enable the message to be received and understood by
ordinary people. Lewis presents the story at the point where every reader is located in
relation to his own life story: in the middle. In this way a commonality, and thus a
relationship, develops between Lewis and the reader. Lewis seems to understand the
power of story and uses it masterfully with an "economy of metaphors" 228 in a way that
neither forces biblical truths on his readers, nor insults their intelligence by explaining the
metaphors. Francis Rossow writes, "Whenever Lewis throws a Gospel-rock into the
water, the reader not only recognizes the point of impact but also experiences the thrill of
seeing an ever widening circle of doctrinal ripples." 229 He emphasizes not the foundations
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of Christianity but the story itself, and this is why, posthumously, he still enjoys a huge
following among those with a different worldview-the postmodem worldview-than
the one he lived with for most of his life.
The theologian has difficulty attempting to argue against theology found in story,
because story is not the proper playing field for such a debate. Story presents the human
condition through characters and scenarios. The reader can relate to these characters
because story is living and active. 230 According to Lyotard, it is through story that true
knowledge is developed. Narrative defines competence by a three-fold criterion: knowhow, knowing how to speak, and knowing how to hear. 231
Similarly, the Narnia Chronicles communicate on an individual level, telling each
person's own story. This might explain their popularity not only among children, but
among adults-teachers, pastors and theologians. Difficult theological concepts and
divine mysteries are presented not as intellectual propositions, but as stories lived out
simply in the lives of the characters. The reader can relate to characters more easily than
to abstract ideas because abstraction divorces truth from life, and thus is helped to
understand the narrative convergence between God's story and the reader's story.

Language Games
William C. Placher notes that "Philosophers go astray when they try to impose
one set of rules on all forms of language. It makes no sense for scientists to condemn
poets because their statements cannot be empirically tested, for instance, just as it makes
no sense for a soccer fan to condemn basketball players for picking up the ball with their
230
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hands-that would be judging by the rules of the wrong game. "232 Modernism, by
limiting itself to one way of using language, has judged reality by the rules of the wrong
game. Postmodernism sees language as unlimited.
Language games were first described by Austrian philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein. He asserts that each use of language exists within a separate and unique set
of rules, and during the dialogue, the participants must become aware of the rules within
that particular discourse. Lyotard likens language games to chess, in which pre-set rules
determine the way each piece is allowed to move. He adds that "Great joy is had in the
endless invention ofturns of phrase, of words and meanings ... But undoubtedly even this
pleasure depends on a feeling of success won at the expense of an adversary-at least one
adversary, and a formidable one: the acceptable language, or connotation."
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notes that adopting language games is the first step to rejecting an objective reality. He
writes, "No proposition can be limited to a single meaning ... because its meaning is
necessarily dependant on its context, the 'language game' in which it appears. Thus, any
sentence has as many meanings as the contexts in which it is used. " 234
In the newspaper articles which became The Screwtape Letters, Lewis invented a
clever language game to illustrate the inner workings of evil by turning common
Christian terminology on its head. What Christians call "bad" and "evil," Screwtape, a
demon, naturally considers "good." What Christians call "God," Screwtape of course
calls "the Enemy." In this way, all the normal uses of these words are inverted. White is
black, black is white-the reader is forced to participate in the language game to
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understand the book. The story has already been mentioned earlier of one offended
minister who, failing to understand the rules of this particular game, apparently believed
that Lewis himself (not Screwtape, the demon who used the language in this upside-down
way) was advocating sinful behavior and canceled his subscription to the newspaper.

Lewis and Myth

Alasdair Macintyre expands on this way of thinking: "Deprive children of stories
and you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in their actions as in their words. Hence
there is no way to give us an understanding of any society, including our own, except
through the stock of stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources. Mythology, in
its original sense, is at the heart ofthings."235
The church is reluctant to associate myth with the Bible. Perhaps it feels that
labeling Christianity a myth would identify it as untrue, or would reduce it to one story
among many, just another myth among thousands. However, myth does not mean a
fictional tale, but rather a "figural or poetic rendering of divine purpose and activity"
which is "necessary for the kind of truth the Bible conveys." 236 Myth then is a story of
God directly at work in the human condition.
Lewis supports this concept of myth. He sees human intellect as incurably
abstract and experience as the only concrete reality. Through myth, Lewis argues, one
can experience a reality that would otherwise be just an abstraction:
What flows into you from the myth is not truth but reality (truth is always
about something, but reality is that about which truth is), and, therefore,
every myth becomes the father of innumerable truths on the abstract level.
Myth is the mountain whence all the different streams arise which become
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truths down here in the valley .... Or, if you prefer, myth is the isthmus
which connects the peninsular world of thought with that vast continent
we really belong to. It is not, like truth, abstract; nor is it, like direct
experience, bound to the particular. 237
Lewis contends that just as God became man without ceasing to be God, so myth
has become fact without ceasing to be myth. The importance of myth is so great that he
even states: "A man who disbelieved the Christian story as fact but continually fed on it
as myth would, perhaps, be more spiritually alive than one who assented and did not
think much about it .... God is more than a god, not less; Christ is more than Balder, not
less. If God chooses to be mythopoeic-and is not the sky itself a myth-shall we refuse
to be mythopoeic? For this is the marriage of heaven and earth: perfect myth and perfect
fact: claiming not only our love and our obedience, but also our wonder and
delight .... " 238
Lewis found a uniqueness in Christianity, a richness in its story and myth. As a
literary critic and professor of medieval literature, as well as an appreciator ofNorse and
Celtic myth, he not only developed a sincere love of story but also learned to detect myth
from historical fact. He saw the power of story to communicate; he saw the world of truth
it can open. He saw narrative as a tool for communicating truth to his fellow human
beings, choosing to speak through children's tales and other forms of story. Through his
love for mythology and literature he learned the art of suggesting truth to the reader
through the actions-both positive and negative--of the characters, rather than through
didactic lessons or moral propositions that others can simply choose to accept or reject.
Story, for Lewis, became a vehicle to present Christ's salvation and doctrine to an
unbelieving world. Through story, the reader becomes engaged with the characters and
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progresses with them through the mountains and valleys of their quest. Story makes
people think in an entirely different way. It forces them to experience truth.
One misconception about postmodernism is that it rejects absolute truth. This is
only partially true: it rejects the modernist definition of truth, which is confined to only
that which can be proven. Truth has a different value to the postmodernist; it means
something entirely different. The truth the postmodernist seeks is not found in a book of
propositions and well-argued systematized doctrine. It is found in life, which is to say
that truth abstracted from life is not truth, or at least is worthless to life. If philosophy
hopes to address us as incarnated, involved, active and ever changing living creatures.
The only way to capture this aspect of the human condition is through narrative.
Without fully knowing what postmodernism would become, Lewis utilized a tool
that is completely postmodern. Through the other lands, worlds, planets and even
dimensions (as in The Screwtape Letters or The Great Divorce) created in his stories,
Lewis is able to present the gospel in a way theological treatises cannot, and therefore is
able to explain Christianity far more effectively than academic theologians ever could. To
Lewis, the birth and life of Christ came out of myth, and he had no difficulty returning
Christianity full circle back to its roots. Perhaps this is why Lewis' most popular work is
his fiction. He saw Christianity as alive, and only through story could he have treated the
truths of this faith so well.

Conclusion
No doubt the reader will find exceptions to what has been written in this study of
C. S. Lewis, probably in the writings of Lewis himself. He vehemently rejects
subjectivism and trumpets reason, yet also condemns modernist liberal theology. He
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claims like a true modernist that words and language represent objects, yet also dabbles
in postmodern language games, which change word meanings in each new context.
In fact, as a result of modernism's dominance over western culture for the last
three centuries, individuals have been mistakenly trying to pigeonhole people into certain
categories. It is impossible to paint Lewis with a single broad stroke. He writes fiction,
yet defends truth. He is a foundationalist, yet a mystic. He argues for Moral Law, yet sees
truth in things beyond it such as myth. He insists he is not a theologian, yet he illustrates
profound doctrines through children, a lion, and a knee-high talking mouse.
Above all, however, C. S. Lewis is a paradox of worldviews. To the modernist, he
is a champion of foundational apologetics, reductionistic individualism, and the
representational theory of language. For devotional readings, the modernist might suggest

Miracles, The Problem of Pain, or Mere Christianity. However, to the postmodern, Lewis
is a storyteller, a questioner of empirical propositions and a respecter of mystery. For a
devotional, the postmodern might choose The Great Divorce or all seven books of The

Chronicles ofNarnia.
Neither view is complete, nor can either paint a complete picture of Lewis without
the other. Lewis, in fact, transcended both worldviews, for he had developed that greatest
of all perspectives: a kingdom worldview that kneels to no other. In this worldview,
Lewis found the freedom to take the best of both modernism and postmodernism (which
encompasses everything that is not modernism) and create fresh new ways to tell a
timeless story of eternal salvation. While there are many intellectual signposts on his
journey toward God, there are also a number of spiritual or even mystical experiences,
and he invites both modernists and postmodernists to come along. Francis Rossow states:
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"The customary language for doctrine becomes so familiar we don't hear it, or, if we do,
it goes in one ear and out the other. .. Lewis not only provides us specific ways to [put the
old wine of Christian doctrine into new wineskins] but also functions as a catalyst to
come up with our own fresh and imaginative ways to communicate Spiritual truth." 239 He
found no limits to his methodology. If he chose to debate doctrine, he wrote a reasoned
apologetic. If he chose to bring it to life, however, he wrote a story.
As the church enters with the rest of the world into the twenty-first century, it
finds itself in somewhat of an identity crisis, reacting in one of two ways to the rise of
postmodernism: either standing boldly yet ignorantly against it, or wrapping itself
completely within it and building a new "postmodern church." Both paths are extreme.
The beginning of the twenty-first century sees society in a postmodern worldview.
Yet postmodernism finds modernism as its source of strength by feeding off of it.
Postmodernism exists for one reason: to stand against its predecessor. It exists to correct
modernism. In a sense, postmodernism is a virus. It lives off its host, unwittingly killing
it in the process. Yet when the host is dead, the virus will die shortly thereafter.
Modernism has been short-lived and has nearly disappeared; it is not the climax of
history. Postmodernism is little more than a transition, a corrective reaction to the
extremities of its predecessor. One can only guess what the next age will look like, but
more than likely, it will not be postmodern. Perhaps it will resemble medieval times once
again-the era which preceded modernism, and the era in which Lewis, as a literature
professor, was an expert.
For the church, this means one thing, as modeled by the paradigmatic example of
C. S. Lewis: it must transcend both worldviews. Lewis showed a way to escape secular
239

Rossow, 296.

Page 89
worldviews and present the gospel any way one can: by being neither a modern nor a
postmodern Christian, but a kingdom Christian with a kingdom worldview. When the
church aligns itself with any other worldview, it is doomed to ineffectiveness when the
secular worldview shifts again-and rest assured, it will.
Before it rushes on to embrace the next rising worldview, the church can and
should look at Lewis as one outstanding model for this kingdom worldview to better
understand its role in the world. Whatever the literary form-autobiography or allegory,
myth or metaphor, fantasy or apology-in the minds of his readers, he covered the
territory thoroughly and compellingly, with an unparalleled balance of intrigue and
clarity. He used every tool in his toolbox, from any and all worldviews. Perhaps the best
explanation of his enduring appeal, through modernism, through postmodernism, and
probably beyond, is found in this simple tribute from his sometime-critic, John Wilson:
" ... Lewis was a good communicator. All his works are readable. He could
communicate to people who had absolutely no theological, or biblical, knowledge. I
would be hard pressed to think of any Christian writers who can do that today. " 240
Let the church take note.
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